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UEFA FINANCIAL FAIRPLAY REGULATIONS AND 
EUROPEAN UNION ANTITRUST LAW COMPLICATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
European Football1 is not just a sport to the rest of the world. Each match is 
more than just a game. A match can and has represented old battles that never 
die completely. The Celtic–Rangers rivalry is more than a cross-town rivalry, 
but a representation of the unfinished political fight over the Protestant 
Reformation.2 The Barcelona–Real Madrid rivalry represents a long-running 
nationalist fight between Castilian and Catalonian Spaniards.3 Celtic’s long 
running rivalry with Rangers Football Club (FC) is just another part of the 
centuries-old rivalry between Northern Irish Catholics and Protestants.4  
While one’s club is a representation of his or her nation and tribe, it is also 
a business, as shown by the globalization of the sport.5 And just like any 
business, occasionally there are financial issues. Just look at Rangers FC, 
where mismanagement and overspending forced the club to go into 
administration and then liquidate in 2012.6 To keep up with its traditional 
rivals, Glasgow Celtic, the Rangers have consistently spent more on players 
 
 1 European Football is known as soccer in America. This article will call soccer “football” for the length 
of the article. 
 2 FRANKLIN FOER, HOW SOCCER EXPLAINS THE WORLD 42 (2004). 
 3 See id. at 200–03. 
 4 See id. at 36, 57. 
 5 See Corporate Information, LIVERPOOLFC.COM, http://www.liverpoolfc.com/corporate/directors (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2013); Tony Karon, What Soccer Means to the World, TIME (July 21, 2004), http://content. 
time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,671302,00.html. Chelsea FC is owed by a Russian billionaire, Roman 
Abramovich, while Liverpool is owned by Fenway Sports Groups. Team compositions have become more 
global; no longer are teams filled with players from the nation the league takes place in, but with players from 
around the world. Id.  
 6 C.S.W., You don’t know what you’ve got ’til it’s gone, THE ECONOMIST (July 13, 2012), http://www. 
economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2012/07/glasgow-rangers’-bankruptcy. Liquidation and administration is the 
process a company undergoes in the UK if the company is going bankrupt. Administration is the process in 
which, after the directors of the company decide the business is insolvent, the court appoints a person in charge 
for the interim. Liquidation is the next step and is the process of winding up a company’s financial affairs. The 
company's assets will be used to pay off creditors. Jill Treanor, Explainer: options for companies in financial 
difficulties, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/jan/05/recession-retail; 
Samuel Barber, Do you know the difference between a company in administration, receivership and 
liquidation?, BUS. LAW TODAY (July 29, 2013), http://www.businesslawtoday.com.au/corporations-law/ 
company-in-administration-receivership-and-liquidation/. 
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than the club could afford on its payroll.7 Between 1999 and 2010, the club lost 
an average of £13 million per season.8 Rangers sustained these considerable 
losses by counting on qualifying for UEFA Champions League each year.9 
However, an upset in the 2008/2009 season caused the club to lose a £10 
million payout, since the Rangers would not receive the financial benefits of 
competing in the Champions League.10 To further compound its financial 
issues, the club management’s ill-advised scheme to reduce the club’s tax 
liability unraveled, and Britain demanded £21.4 million in back taxes.11 This 
was enough to push the Rangers into insolvency. The club entered 
administration, resulting in liquidation.12 Rangers FC’s business and assets 
were sold to a new company and the Rangers in the 2012/2013 season were no 
longer one of the two premier clubs in Scotland, but instead a club in Scottish 
League One, the third tier of the Scottish Professional Football League.13 
Lately, this has not been an unusual story in European football. Valencia 
Club de Fútbol (CF), a Spanish team, which won La Liga, the Spanish top tier 
league, and reached the Champions League final twice in the early 2000’s, fell 
into terrible financial trouble, owing €547 million during the 2009/2010 
season.14 Again, this huge debt originated from a mix of bad management 
decisions and overspending.15 Valencia CF bought several players who would 
never play a significant role on the team for an average of €17 million each, 
 
 7 C.S.W., supra note 6. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. The Champions League is an annual continental club football competition organized by the Union 
of European Football Associations (UEFA) for the best thirty-two teams in Europe. Champions League 
football is considered one of the most prestigious tournaments in the world. UEFA Champions League 
Competition Format, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, http://uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/season=2015/ 
competitionformat/index.html. 
 10 C.S.W., supra note 6. 
 11 Id. Between 2001 and 2010, Rangers FC routed £48 million to eighty-seven players and staff through 
trust funds held by a British bank. The British government considers these types of payments loans, unless the 
transfers are incorporated into player contracts when the government considers these payments salaries, half of 
which is taxable for high-income workers, the football players. Id. 
 12 Jim Worstall, Rangers Bankruptcy: This is What Happens to Companies That Rely on Human Capital, 
FORBES (Feb. 18, 2012, 7:21 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/02/18/rangers-bankruptcy-
this-is-what-happens-to-companies-that-rely-on-human-capital/; Douglas Fraser, Rangers’ liquidation Q&A, 
BBC NEWS (June 12, 2012, 4:05 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-18418513. 
 13 Fraser, supra note 12.  
 14 Conor Queenan, 5 Reasons Why Valencia CF Are Set to Win Another La Liga, BLEACHER REP. (Dec. 
21, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/993301-5-reasons-why-valencia-cf-are-set-to-win-another-la-liga; 
Sid Lowe, Valencia’s Debts Threaten the Very Existence of the Club, WORLD SOCCER (2008), http://www. 
worldsoccer.com/uncategorized/valencias-debts-threaten-the-very-existence-of-the-club-writes-sid-lowe. 
 15 Lowe, supra note 14.  
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paid £30 million on severance payments to managers, and began to build a new 
stadium before selling the grounds of the old stadium.16 
Rangers FC and Valencia CF are not at all atypical. Clubs with financial 
issues became a common theme in the last decade.17 By 2011, 63% of clubs in 
the top tiers had an operating loss in the 2011 Financial Year.18 Together, these 
clubs had an operating loss of €388 million.19 Fifty-Five percent of clubs had 
an operating loss of €1.675 million.20 Finally, 38% of clubs reported a negative 
net equity in 2011.21 
The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), the administrative 
body for football, in Europe, observed this problem and approved Financial 
Fair Play Regulations (FFP) to fix these financial issues.22 FFP intends to 
introduce rationality and stabilize the financial environment of European Club 
football.23 UEFA’s objective centered on preventing financial situations similar 
to Rangers FC and Valencia CF for the “game’s well-being.”24 
As straightforward and valid as the objectives of UEFA were in creating 
FFP, the structure of FFP makes the regulation illegal under the European 
Union’s competition law. On May 6, 2013, Daniel Striani, an agent, who 
represents football players, represented by lawyer Jean-Louis Dupont, lodged a 
complaint with the European Commission against UEFA’s FFP regulations, 
and later lodged a second legal challenge in the Court of First Instance in 
 
 16 Id. In part, the global economic crisis contributed to Valencia FC’s financial troubles. Valencia FC 
began to build the new stadium. Before selling the grounds of the old stadium the housing bubble burst, 
leaving the club unable to find a buyer. Valencia FC counted on selling the old stadium grounds to pay for the 
new stadium. Id.; Dermot Corrigan, Varona: Valencia not for sale, ESPN FC (Apr. 4, 2013), http://espnfc. 
com/news/story/_/id/1398925/varona-assures-fans:-valencia-not-for-sale?cc=5901. 
 17 See generally UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, THE EUROPEAN CLUB LICENSING BENCHMARKING 
REPORT FINANCIAL YEAR 2011 115 (2011) [hereinafter BENCHMARKING REPORT], http://www.uefa.com/ 
MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/01/91/61/84/1916184_DOWNLOAD.pdf.  
 18 BENCHMARKING REPORT, supra note 17, at 101. The year 2011 is used for statistics because it is the 
last year before the FFP went into effect. UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, Financial Fair Play, http://www. 
uefa.com/uefa/footballfirst/protectingthegame/financialfairplay/index.html (last updated Nov. 5, 2014). 
 19 BENCHMARKING REPORT, supra note 17, at 101. 
 20 Id. at 105; Stefan Szymanski, European football will never be the same again, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 
18, 2013, 4:50 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a13db70c-05d7-11e3-8ed5-00144feab7de.html#axzz2fl62 
VaJN. 
 21 BENCHMARKING REPORT, supra note 17, at 115.  
 22 Financial Fair Play, supra note 18. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See id. 
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Brussels.25 Although the full FFP regulations will not be implemented until 
2015,26 the predicted effect of FFP on the player market and competition 
between teams clearly violates EU competition law. This Comment will 
explore the multiple ways that FFP violates EU competition law, and offer a 
way for UEFA to achieve the objectives of FFP without violating EU 
competition law. 
This Comment is structured in five parts. Part I gives a general overview of 
how European football is structured, why clubs risk overspending, the 
Financial Fair Play Regulations, and the lawsuit against UEFA by Mr. Striani. 
Part II will give a brief overview of the antitrust framework FFP Regulations 
will be tested against. Part III discusses exactly how FFP violates EU 
competition law under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). Part IV discusses how FFP violates EU competition 
law under Article 102 of the TFEU. Finally, Part V will suggest alternatives to 
FFP. This Comment will argue that the FFP Regulations are illegal under both 
Article 101(1) and Article 102 of the TFEU. 
I. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN FOOTBALL AND THE NEW FFP 
REGULATIONS 
The way football is structured is very different than American sports, 
therefore this Comment will give a brief background of how European football 
is structured for context. The way European Football is structured influences 
the way club owners decide to spend money, and this Comment will explain 
why. Next, this Comment will explain in depth the Financial Fair Play 
Regulations, and the lawsuit against UEFA by Mr. Striani. 
A. How European Football is Structured 
The way FFP affects football is dependent on how football is structured, 
both its regulatory body and league structure. A quick overview of football’s 
regulatory body and league structure will be given for context to understand 
how FFP Regulations will affect the clubs and leagues. 
 
 25 David Conn, Players’ agent launches legal threat to UEFA financial fair play rules, THE GUARDIAN 
(May 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2013/may/06/agent-legal-threat-uefa-financial-fair-play; 
Soccer agent takes legal action in financial fair play battle, CNN INTERNATIONAL (June 20, 2013, 5:58 GMT), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/20/sport/football/uefa-financial-fair-play-bosman-football/index.html. 
 26 UEFA delays Financial Fair Play Rules, FOURFOURTWO (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.fourfourtwo. 
com/news/uefa-delay-financial-fair-play-rules. 
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1. Regulatory Body Structure 
The structure of football worldwide is strictly hierarchal, from the 
grassroots level to the elite level.27 UEFA is one of six confederations in the 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the international 
governing body of football.28 UEFA is an administrative body that is 
responsible for running national and club competitions, and controls the prize 
money, regulations and media rights to those competitions.29 This body is 
comprised of each nation’s national football association, with a total of fifty-
two associations.30 
Each nation’s football association is comprised of the nation’s leagues and 
regional associations.31 Each association is comprised of the nation’s clubs, 
which are in turn formed by individuals.32 This pyramidal structure is also 
reflected in the regulatory bodies of football, with FIFA at the top, a regional 
regulatory authority (such as UEFA) in the middle, and each country’s 
Football Association at the bottom.33 For example, in Great Britain, the top 
clubs created the Premier League, which is under the regulation of the Football 
Association (FA), and must submit to its rules and sanctions.34 The FA in turn 
 
 27 MATTHEW HOLT, UEFA, GOVERNANCE, AND THE CONTROL OF CLUB COMPETITION IN EUROPEAN 
FOOTBALL 10 (2009), available at http://www.sportbusinesscentre.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/UEFA1. 
pdf. 
 28 The Organisation: Confederations, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/ 
confederations/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2014). 
 29 UEFA champions league revenue distribution, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS (Sept. 15, 2014, 
12:17 CET), www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/news/newsid=2146867.html; see also UEFA Nations 
League: all you need to know, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS (Dec. 5, 2014, 12:15 CET), www.uefa.com/ 
community/news/newsid=2079553.html. 
 30 HOLT, supra note 27, at 15. While many of the national associations represent different nations, being a 
nation is not required to be a national association eligible to join UEFA. For example, the United Kingdom is 
not part of UEFA, but Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland, and England are each national associations that are a 
part of UEFA. Additionally, Israel is part of UEFA instead of the Asian Football Conference due to the 
potential violent conflicts if Israel was to draw a Middle Eastern team. See generally James Montague, Time is 
right for Israel to return to its Asian roots, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
football/2008/feb/27/worldcup2010. 
 31 Id. at 10.  
 32 HOLT, supra note 26 at 10; see also THE FOOTBALL ASS’N, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION (2013–2014), 
available at http://www.thefa.com/~/media/Files/TheFAPortal/governance-docs/rules-of-the-association/2013-
14/articles-of-association.ashx. 
 33 Pierre Ducrey et al., UEFA and Football Governance: A New Model 11 (June 30, 2003) (International 
Masters (MA) Final Project Work, Centre International D’Etude du Sport), http://kassiesa.net/uefafiles/2003-
fifamaster-uefa-governance.pdf. 
 34 The Premier League is a private company owned by the twenty clubs who make up the League at that 
time. Additionally, the Football Association (FA) is a special shareholder in the Premier League. Formal 
Relations, PREMIER LEAGUE, http://www.premierleague.com/en-gb/about/formal-relations.html. 
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must submit to UEFA’s control, which in turn must submit to FIFA’s, the 
ultimate regulatory body, control.35 
Through this hierarchal structure, the representative structure is based on 
the football associations; however, recently clubs have become more involved 
at the UEFA level through the European Club Association (ECA), and the 
European Professional Football Leagues.36 Additionally, even though this 
structure is strictly hierarchical, clubs can choose to break away from UEFA or 
FIFA; the hierarchical structure of European football is currently governed by 
a memorandum of understanding that expired in 2014.37 The likelihood of the 
clubs breaking away was always low, and ultimately they stayed.38 
2. League Structure 
The structure of the European leagues themselves is unlike anything in 
American sports. Unlike American sports, a team in the top league is not 
guaranteed will continue to play in the top league the next season.39 For 
example, in Great Britain there are four leagues.40 At the end of each season, 
the three teams with the worst record in the Premier League, the top tier in 
English football, are dropped to the second tier, the Championship League. 
The top two teams in the Championship League are promoted to the Premier 
League, with the third spot given to the winner of promotion playoffs between 
teams in third to sixth place, while the three teams with the worst record in the 
Championship League are dropped to League One, the third tier.41 
This structure allows clubs who were on the top to sink to the bottom, 
while teams in lower leagues may rise to the top of the Premier League. For 
example, historically Leeds United, a strong team finished consistently in the 
 
 35 Formal Relations, PREMIER LEAGUE, http://www.premierleague.com/en-gb/about/formal-relations. 
html. 
 36 Who we are, PREMIER LEAGUE, http://www.premierleague.com/content/premierleague/en-gb/about/ 
who-we-are.html. 
 37 Matt Scott, Top European clubs threaten to break away from Fifa and Uefa, THE GUARDIAN (July 27, 
2011), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2011/jul/27/European-clubs-breakaway-fifa-uefa. 
 38 See id.; Rob Hughes, The Competing Demands of Soccer Clubs and FIFA, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/sports/soccer/03iht-LEAGUE03.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. The Clubs 
could create another governing body, and another European league. Id. 
 39 Trey Jones, When Pigs Fly: Regulation in College Football, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 13, 2009), http:// 
bleacherreport.com/articles/138591-when-pigs-fly-regulation-in-college-football. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See Mike Steere, Explainer: How Relegation Works, CNN (May 18, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2009/SPORT/football/05/18/relegation.explainer/index.html. 
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top of the Premier League, however, within the past decade Leeds United 
dropped all the way to League One for several seasons.42 
Additionally, depending where a club places in the highest league, the club 
may be eligible to play in competitions run by UEFA, which are played all 
across Europe. There are two tournaments: Champions League and Europa 
League, commonly known as European football. The number of clubs that may 
participate from each football association in these competitions is determined 
by a coefficient.43 The coefficient determines which clubs may compete in the 
more prestigious Champions League or the Europa League.44 To compete in 
these competitions, each club individually needs to be licensed by UEFA.45 
B. Why Clubs Over-Spend 
All clubs wish to compete in the more prestigious Champions League or 
Europa League. Clubs are very likely to risk overspending to achieve typical 
sporting prestige, and because of the financial incentives involved.46 Winning 
begets money, which allows teams to sign up better players, which begets 
more winning. Losing consistently, by contrast, can have dire financial 
consequences. For example, Premier League teams’ revenues were over £2 
billion in comparison to Championship Clubs’ revenues of just over £400 
million.47 If a team drops to Championship League, there is an average loss of 
£20 million in income.48 There a 50% chance that the club dropped to the 
Championship League will not reach the Premier League again and a 30% 
chance that the club will drop to next lower league - League One.49 
Additionally, some have estimated that there is a £90–€150 million award for 
 
 42 Jones, supra note 38. 
 43 See Press Association, Uefa confirms plans to change Chapion League seeding system, The Guardian 
(Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/oct/10/uefa-champions-league-seedings-change; 
see also UEFA rankings, UEFA.com, http://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/uefarankings/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2015). 
 44 Press Association, supra note 43. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE, 2010-12, H.C. 792-I., ¶ 77–
78 (U.K.) [hereinafter FFP Regulations], http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/uefaorg/ 
General/01/80/54/10/1805410_DOWNLOAD.pdf. 
 47 Id. ¶ 75. 
 48 SportingIntelligence, TWITTER (Apr. 25, 2014, 11:19 AM), https://twitter.com/sportingintel/status/ 
459758654972256257/photo/1. 
 49 Id. 
KAPLAN GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/17/2015 9:57 AM 
806 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
those clubs that earn a promotion to the Premier League, due to the increased 
TV money, attendance, and advertising.50 
Also, clubs who compete in the Champions League, the equivalent of a 
regional World Cup for each country’s club football teams, receive additional 
money.51 For example, in the 2012/2013 season, Manchester United received 
£39.3 million for participating in the Champions League from the group stage 
to the round of sixteen, and Chelsea FC received £40.9 million after falling out 
of the Champions League during the group stage and advancing to the final 
and winning the Europa League.52 The money the clubs receive from the 
Champions League is a mix of money for participating and from broadcasting 
revenues.53 All clubs receive equal amounts for participating based on how far 
they proceed into the competition.54 Clubs do not receive an equal amount of 
broadcasting money, which is based on the size of their country’s population.55 
That means Manchester City from England received £18.7 million of the 
broadcasting money, while SC Braga from Portugal received only £1.5 million, 
despite competing in the same number of rounds.56 
For most owners, the ability to receive these financial awards are a means 
to an end, the means to be able to win again and gain further club prestige.57 If 
a club can overspend but reach the continental wide tournaments, such as the 
Champions League, many owners consider the risk well-worth taking, due to 
the huge increase in revenue and the prestige the club will gain.58 After 
reaching the top league, there is pressure for a club to remain in the top league 
 
 50 Parliament Report, supra note 46, ¶ 76; Financial Fair Play takes hold, IRISH EXAMINER (Aug. 11, 
2014), http://www.irishexaminer.com/sport/soccer/financial-fair-play-takes-hold-279086.html. 
 51 See Ed Thompson, Widening Gap between elite clubs and the rest, FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY (Sept. 18, 
2013), http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/latest-news/widening-gap-between-elite-clubs-and-the-rest-. 
 52 UEFA Prize Money-Rhapsody in Blue, THE SWISS RAMBLE (May 7, 2013), http://swissramble. 
blogspot.co.uk/search/label/Chelsea. This money received by the clubs participating in UEFA’s tournaments is 
from a combination of prize money based on participation and results, and share of the television money. The 
structure of the Champions League is to have a group stage, similar to the Group Stage in the World Cup, 
where a win is 3 points, a draw is 1 point and no points for a loss. After all games are played, the top two 
teams in each group advance to a knock out round called the group of sixteen, similar to the Sweet Sixteen in 
March Madness. The top third team in each group plays in the Europa League, the secondary European Club 
championship. 
 53 Thompson, supra note 51. 
 54 See id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id.; see UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, UEFA Champions League: Distribution to Clubs 
2012/2013 (2013), http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/Finance/01/97/52/97/1975297_ 
DOWNLOAD.pdf. 
 57 Parliament Report, supra note 46, ¶ 77. 
 58 Id. ¶ 77, 96. 
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and to reach its next goal of competing in these continental wide 
tournaments.59 With this in mind, prestige and triumph becomes more of a 
priority than sound financial decisions.60 
C. Financial Fair Play Regulations 
Recognizing the priorities of the owners to reach the Champions League at 
any cost, and in light of many clubs reporting financial losses in a difficult 
economic market, UEFA became concerned with the ability of the clubs to 
keep their finances healthy.61 These fears were magnified by the fact that in 
some clubs, such as Valencia CF, financial issues began to affect day-to-day 
operations.62 In view of this situation, UEFA’s Executive Committee in 
September 2009 approved the concept of financial fair play.63 In May 2010, 
UEFA approved the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play 
Regulations, and later updated the regulations in 2012.64 UEFA stated six 
objectives it expected FFP to accomplish: 
• to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances; 
• to decrease pressure on salaries and transfer fees and limit inflationary 
effect; 
• to encourage clubs to compete with(in) their revenues; 
• to encourage long-term investments in the youth sector and 
infrastructure; 
• to protect the long-term viability of European club football; 
• to ensure clubs settle their liabilities on a timely basis.65 
There are two main parts to FFP: (1) Clubs’ transfer and employee 
payables must not be overdue (this has been monitored since the summer of 
2013); and (2) clubs will be required to have their books break even starting in 
the financial years ending 2012 and 2013 (which will be accessed for the first 
 
 59 Id. ¶ 77. 
 60 Id. ¶ 77–78. 
 61 See generally BENCHMARKING REPORT, supra note 17. 
 62 Id. Valencia CF was unable to pay its players for several months in the middle of the 2009/2010 
season. Valencia slip further away from salvation, FIFA.COM (Mar. 8, 2009), http://www.fifa.com/world-
match-centre/news/newsid/103/563/6/index.html. 
 63 BENCHMARKING REPORT, supra note 17, at 46, 48; Green light for Financial Fair Play, UNION OF 
EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS (Sept. 5, 2009), http://www.uefa.org/stakeholders/professionalfootballstrategycouncil/ 
news/newsid=879610.html. 
 64 BENCHMARKING REPORT, supra note 17, at 46, 48. 
 65 Financial Fair Play, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS (June 11, 2014), http://www.uefa.org/ 
protecting-the-game/club-licensing-and-financial-fair-play/index.html. 
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time before the 2013/2014 season).66 Beginning with the 2013/2014 season, 
clubs are faced with sanctions from European football if they do not comply 
with FFP.67 The sanctions UEFA can impose include withholding prize money, 
excluding the club from European competitions, a fine, or a reprimand.68 For 
example, in 2014, UEFA found that Manchester City violated FFP and 
imposed the following punishments: a €60 million settlement to be paid to the 
European governing body over three years, a 21-player limit to the 2014/2015 
season’s Champions League squad, and a wage cap to the current level.69 In 
2014, UEFA found that the Serbian club Red Star Belgrade violated FFP and 
banned the club from the 2014/2015 season Champions League.70 FFP will not 
be fully implemented before the 2017 financial year, as clubs will be allowed 
to have a limited loss each year.71 
The UEFA Club Financial Control Body is in charge of carrying out FFP.72 
This body will be in charge of monitoring the clubs to make sure they comply 
with the break-even provision.73 The clubs are permitted to lose €45 million 
between the 2011/2012 season and the 2013/2014 season. From the 2014/2015 
to the 2017/2018 season, the overall permitted loss will be €30 million.74 After 
that period, clubs are expected to break even, and owners are not permitted to 
bail the clubs out.75 However, there is an acceptable €5 million deviation.76 
The relevant expenses considered in the break-even assessment includes the 
 
 66 BENCHMARKING REPORT, supra note 17, at 49. 
 67 Financial Fair Play Explained, FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY, http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/financial-
fair-play-explained.php; Wayne Veysey, What is Financial Fair Play and how will Uefa enforce it on the likes 
of Chelsea, Manchester City and Barcelona?, GOAL (May 8, 2011), http://www.goal.com/en-gb/news/2866/ 
analysis/2011/05/11/2479628/what-is-financial-fair-play-and-how-will-uefa-enforce-it-on. 
 68 Daniel Geey, UEFA Sanctions Clubs for Debt and Financial Fair Play, THE FINAL SCORE OF 
FOOTBALL LAW (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.danielgeey.com/uefa-sanctions-clubs-for-debt-and-financial-fair-
play-update/; UEFA hands out first Financial fair play penalties, BBC (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/ 
sport/0/football/19557934. 
 69 David Conn, Manchester City take the lead to face down Uefa over break-even rules, THE GUARDIAN 
(May 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/football/david-conn-inside-sport-blog/2014/may/10/manchester-
city-face-down-uefa-financial-fair-play. 
 70 Red Star Belgrade excluded from Champions League after FFP breach, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/jun/06/red-star-belgrade-excluded-champions-league-ffp-
uefa. 
 71 FFP Regulations, supra note 46, art. 61. 
 72 Id. art. 1. 
 73 Id. art. 58. 
 74 Id. art. 61. 
 75 Wayne Veysey, La Liga boys will continue to cherry-pick Premier League stars, GOAL (Feb. 10, 
2011), http://www.goal.com/en-gb/news/2896/premier-league/2011/02/10/2346282/financial-fair-play-could-
hinder-english-clubs-but-wont-stop?ICID=AR_RA_4. 
 76 FFP Regulations, supra note 46, art. 61. 
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cost of sales, employee benefits expenses, and other operating expenses, plus 
either amortization or costs of acquiring player registrations, finance costs and 
dividends.77 Costs that do not count toward the break-even assessment include 
youth development, stadium infrastructure, and community development.78 
Additionally, the clubs will not be allowed any overdue payables to other 
football clubs, or overdue payables towards employees, or social/tax 
authorities.79 The clubs will have the responsibility to report any significant 
economic event that occurs during the license season to UEFA.80 
If the clubs do not meet these requirements under the break-even provision, 
UEFA has the ability to consider a number of factors before imposing 
sanctions.81 These factors include: an improving financial trend, the impact of 
exchange rates, budgeting accuracy, the debt situation, and force majeure 
(circumstances beyond the club’s control).82 
An important characteristic of FFP is that it only applies to competitions 
run by UEFA—the Champions and Europa Leagues.83 FFP is only required by 
clubs seeking a UEFA license, which is required to compete in their 
competitions.84 However, every club wants a UEFA license, due to the prestige 
and financial incentives in competing in the Champions and Europa Leagues.85 
It is therefore likely that FFP will effectively apply to every football club in 
Europe. 
D. The Lawsuit 
Daniel Striani, an agent for football players represented by lawyer Jean-
Louis Dupont, lodged a complaint with the European Commission against 
UEFA’s FFP regulations on May 6, 2013. The European Commission released 
a statement in May 2014 that it intends to dismiss the complaint and Striani 
had four weeks to submit observations before the Commission’s decision 
 
 77 Id. art. 58. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. art. 66. 
 80 Id. art. 67. 
 81 Id. art. 68. 
 82 BENCHMARKING REPORT, supra note 17, Annex XI. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. art. 1. 
 85 See supra Part I.B. 
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becomes final.86 A group of supporters from England, France, and Belgium 
have also filed a complaint with the European Commission, in July 2014.87 
However, Striani also lodged a second legal challenge against UEFA in the 
Court of First Instance in Brussels.88 In October 2013, Striani appeared for a 
hearing before the Court of First Instance to determine the schedule for hearing 
the complaint; the hearing will took in February 2015 and the judgment should 
be expected in March or April 2015.89 
According to Dupont’s editorial in the Wall Street Journal, he specifically 
alleges that the break-even rule is anti-competitive.90 Dupont claims that FFP 
restricts competition in these ways: 
• Restriction of investments 
• Fossilization of the existing market structure 
• Reduction of the number of transfers, of the transfer amounts and 
of the number of players under contracts per club 
• Deflationary effect on the level of players’ salaries.91 
Dupont further believes that FFP constitutes collusion, and infringes on 
other EU freedoms such as freedom of movement and services.92 This lawsuit 
is commonly known as the Striani challenge. 
EU Commission has issued a joint statement with UEFA supporting the 
FFP regulations.93 However, this statement is not binding. Additionally, the 
 
 86 David Conn, Uefa defeats legal challenge to financial fair play rules, THE GUARDIAN (May 20, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/may/20/uefa-defeats-financial-fair-play-challenge; Javier Silles, 
Dupont: El Fair Play Financiero crea una especie de NBA, AS.COM (Aug. 20, 2014), http://futbol.as.com/ 
futbol/2014/08/20/internacional/1408487874_102747.html. 
 87 Press Release: Football Fans Launch Legal Challenge to Financial Fair Play, LAWINSPORT.COM 
(July 25, 2014), http://www.lawinsport.com/sports-law-news/item/press-release-football-fans-launch-legal-
challenge-to-financial-fair-play. 
 88 Ed Thompson, Legal challenge to UEFA FFP rules by ‘Bosman’ Lawyer, FIN. FAIR PLAY (May 9, 
2013), http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/latest-news/legal-challenge-to-uefa-ffp-rules-by-bosman-lawyer. 
 89 Moment of truth for UEFA: Financial Fair Play Ruling Due in 2015, CNN (Jan. 10, 2014), http:// 
edition.cnn.com/2014/01/10/sport/football/financial-fair-play-uefa-football/. 
 90 Jean-Louis Dupont, Football’s Anticompetitive Streak, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://online.wsj. 
com/article/SB10001424127887324077704578357992271428024.html. At this time, the court filings have not 
been published. 
 91 Thompson, supra note 88. 
 92 Dupont, supra note 90. 
 93 Joint Statement by Vice-President Joaquin Almuni and President Michel Platini (Mar. 21, 2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/joint_statement_en.pdf; Letter from Michel Platini, President, 
UEFA to Joaquin Almunia,Vice-President of the Euopean Commission (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.uefa.org/ 
MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/EuropeanUnion/01/77/21/75/1772175_DOWNLOAD.pdf. 
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statement primarily addresses how FFP furthers EU’s policy in the field of 
state aid and does not address the competition law issues with FFP.94 
II. EU COMPETITION LAW FRAMEWORK 
There are two main parts to EU competition law: Article 101(1) of TFEU 
and Article 102 of TFEU, formerly known as Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty.95 Article 101(1) states the following: 
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may 
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the internal market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any 
other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical 
development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by 
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contracts.96 
This provision covers agreements between two or more independent market 
operators in which horizontal and vertical agreements that restrict competition 
of any kind are prohibited.97 Article 101(1) is similar to Section 1 of the 
 
 94 State aid is when undertakings gain government support, which gives the undertaking an advantage 
over a competitor. State aid is forbidden unless justified by general economic development. This is an issue in 
football, because when some clubs, like Valencia FC, began to fail financially, the government stepped in to 
support the club. This issue will be not addressed in this Comment. State Aid Control Overview, EUR. COMM’N 
(Aug. 8, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html; Varona: Valencia not for 
sale, ESPN FC (Apr. 4, 2013), http://espnfc.com/news/story/_/id/1398925/varona-assures-fans:-valencia-not-
for-sale?cc=5901. 
 95 Antitrust Overview, EUR. COMM’N (Aug. 16, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/ 
overview_en.html; Application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (formerly Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty), 
EUR. COMM’N (Mar. 3, 2011), http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/firms/l26092_en.htm. 
 96 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, Mar. 25, 1957, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 88–89. 
 97 Antitrust Overview, supra note 95. 
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Sherman Antitrust Act.98 The Striani challenge is challenging FFP under 
Article 101(1).99 
Article 102 is similar to Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of U.S. 
antitrust law.100 Article 102 states the following: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may 
affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, 
consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to 
the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance 
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by 
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts.” 101 
Article 102 basically prohibits an undertaking of a dominant position to abuse 
that position.102 
In EU law, there is no special exception for sporting cases in EU 
competition law. In the Meca-Medina and Macjen v Commission opinion of 
2006, the Court of Justice determined that if there is economic activity, then 
EU competition law applies.103 Further, in Walrave v Union Cycliste 
Internationale, the Court of Justice held that a professional sport is an 
economic activity.104 There is obvious economic activity at play here, as 
European football affords clubs the ability to make money in the range of €40 
 
 98 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). 
 99 See Thompson, supra note 88. 
 100 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004). 
 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102, Mar. 25, 1957, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 89. 
 102 Antitrust Overview, supra note 95. 
 103 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Macjen v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-6991; Andrew Nixon, Daniel 
Striani and Uefa’s Financial Fair Play regulations: the new Bosman?, SPORTING INTELLIGENCE (May 13, 
2013), http://www.sportingintelligence.com/2013/05/13/daniel-striani-and-uefas-financial-fair-play-
regulations-the-new-bosman-130501/. 
 104 Case 36/74, Walrave v. Union Cycliste Internationale, 1974 E.C.R. 1405. 
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million per year, from a combination of broadcasting revenue and prize 
money.105 
This Comment will address each of these articles in turn, as it is undecided 
if the UEFA is considered an association of undertakings, or an undertaking 
itself. The status of the UEFA will determine under which of the articles FFP 
will fall under. Therefore, first, there must be a discussion on whether the 
UEFA would be considered an association of undertakings and/or an 
undertaking itself. An undertaking is an economic entity itself.106 The 
European Commission takes the view that the UEFA is considered an 
association of undertakings, but is an undertaking itself as well.107 This is 
based on the Court of Justice view that an undertaking includes “every entity 
engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity.”108 
With the UEFA, starting from the bottom of the pyramid structure, each club 
itself makes money through the sale of tickets, merchandise and so on, making 
each club an undertaking.109 When the clubs combine to make the leagues, and 
consequently football associations, the leagues and football associations are 
associations of undertakings. However, the leagues and football associations 
also engage in economic activities themselves, such as through advertising, 
selling tickets and merchandise, and television broadcasting, which make the 
football associations undertakings as well.110 The football associations then 
comprise to form the UEFA, an association of undertakings.111 Further, like the 
leagues and football associations, the UEFA engages directly in economic 
activity, making it an undertaking as well.112 The UEFA, as the only 
organization organizing establishing European-wide football competitions, 
holds a dominate position in the European football market. That is why there is 
potential for FFP to be challenged under either Article 101(1) or Article 102. 
 
 105 See supra Part I.B. 
 106 Case C-67/96, Albany v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5751. 
 107 Commission Decision 2003/778, 2003 O.J. (L 291) 25, 42 [hereinafter Commission Decision]. 
 108 Case C-67/96, Albany v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5751. 
 109 Dirk Kaufmann, UEFA has commercialized football, DW (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.dw.de/uefa-
has-commercialized-football/a-17095173. 
 110 For example, the English Football Association (FA), owns the rights to the English internationals, and 
the FA cup. FA receives TV money from English international games and FA cup games. FOOTBALL ASS’N 
LTD., 2012 REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 17 (2013). 
 111 See supra Part I.A.i. 
 112 The UEFA receives money from the media rights and commercial contracts from the Champions 
League. The UEFA’s gross revenue is just under 1.5 billion euros just from each Champions League season, 
and the UEFA keeps twenty percent of that amount. This amount does not include any money UEFA makes 
from the Europa League. Kaufmann, supra note 109.  
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If the UEFA is found to be a single undertaking, then FFP would be 
considered an Article 102 violation. However, if the UEFA is found to be an 
association of undertakings, then FFP would be considered an Article 101(1) 
violation due to the various independent undertakings colluding in an anti-
competitive agreement that is illegal under Article 101(1). 
The Striani challenge claims FFP falls under Article 101, asserting that the 
UEFA is essentially a trade association for legal purposes.113 The Striani 
challenge argues that FFP is a joint agreement limiting clubs ability to spend 
money on players’ wages and transfers.114 Ultimately, however, it does not 
matter under which of these articles the UEFA will fall, as FFP would be 
illegal under either article. If the Striani challenge fails under Article 101(1), 
another challenge can be posed under Article 102. However, the Article 101(1) 
argument is much stronger than an argument under Article 102, so it would be 
easier for the Striani challenge to succeed under Article 101(1). 
Next, before evaluating FFP under EU competition law, the market must be 
defined first, as in any competition law case.115 EU competition law requires 
that the market be defined first in terms of geography and then in terms of 
product.116 The geographical market is comprised of all the areas in which the 
undertakings are involved in the supply and demand of the products and where 
the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous.117 Here, the 
geographic market is comprised of all fifty-four nations that compete in the 
UEFA.118 This is basically all of Europe, including countries that do not belong 
to the EU.119  
Next, the product market must be determined. The product market is 
comprised of “all [the] products and/or services that are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ 
characteristics, their prices and their intended use.”120 The main characteristic 
 
 113 See Dupont, supra note 90. 
 114 Id. 
 115 ARIEL EZRACHI, EU COMPETITION LAW: AN ANALYTICAL GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES 29 (3d ed. 
2012). 
 116 Id.; see Commission Notice 97/C372/03, 1997 O.J. (C 372) 5, 6.  
 117 EZRACHI, supra note 115. 
 118 UEFA rankings: Country coefficients 2014/15, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/uefarankings/country/index.html. 
 119 See Commission Notice 97/C372/03, 1997 O.J. (C 372) 5, 6; see also supra text accompanying note 
30. 
 120 Commission Notice 97/C372/03, 1997 O.J. (C 372) 5, 6.  
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to determine a product market is to determine if there is any substitute for that 
product.121 
The UEFA is organized as an association of football associations that 
overlooks football competitions and clubs, specifically European-wide 
competitions. The product market is therefore professional club European 
football competitions.122 There are no substitutes for this. While people can 
watch other professional sports, it is a different type of entertainment than 
football, as people only prefer to watch certain sports. The national team 
competitions have a different market and, therefore, are considered a different 
product.123 No other European-wide club competitions exist. Therefore, no 
other product, including national team competitions, can compare to watching 
the club competitions.124 
III. ARTICLE 101(1) 
Article 101(1) violations are comprised of three elements.125 First, there 
must be proof that there is some form of collusion between undertakings.126 
Second, the collusion must affect trade between member states.127 Third, the 
agreement must have the “object or effect of restricting competition within the 
common market.”128 Each of these elements will be taken in turn to show that 
FFP violates Article 101(1) and, therefore, considered illegal by violating EU 
 
 121 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 32 (citing Case 27/76, United Brands v. Comm’n, 1978 E.C.R., 207). 
 122 In U.S. antitrust law, it has been held that the market of sports teams is that specific sport. See Flood v. 
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282–83 (1972) (discussing baseball antitrust exceptions). For example, when analyzing 
baseball antitrust cases, the market was held to be professional baseball. See id. 
 123 Club competitions have a different market from national competitions, because club teams have 
globalized and their audience and supporters are all over the world. While, national competitions have the 
audience of their country and traditionally their supporters are composed of their citizens. 
 124 Even if there is limited substitutability, products can be held to be different markets. If products are 
used for different purposes, the products belong to separate markets. For example, in Hoffmann-La Roche v 
Commission, the Court of Justice held that limited substitution seemed insufficient to establish 
interchangeability. Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461. Club and national 
competitions have limited substitution, as people tend to support their country in the national competition, and 
have a club team they cheer for as well, it may be the same sport, but club and national team competitions have 
different audiences. See EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 3. 
 125 See VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 40 (9th 
ed. 2007). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id.  
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competition law. Article 101(1) does not distinguish between horizontal and 
vertical agreements.129 
A. Collusion between Undertakings 
Article 101(1) requires that there be an agreement between undertakings or 
a decision by an association of undertakings.130 If the view is taken that the 
UEFA is an association of undertakings, or an association of associations of 
undertakings, then Article 101(1) is violated.131 The articles of an association, 
such as the UEFA, rarely amount to anticompetitive activity that offends 
Article 101(1).132 It is more frequent that agreements among the members in an 
association violates Article 101(1).133 Often, the attempt to impose discipline 
or order into the market violates Article 101(1).134  
FFP is an explicit agreement135 between undertakings attempting to impose 
discipline into the football market violating Article 101(1). While the UEFA is 
considered an undertaking itself, it is also made up of other undertakings (the 
football associations) that approve FFP.136 Additionally, FFP is approved by 
the UEFA Club Competitions Committee, the European Club Association 
Board, and the Professional Football Strategy Council, which is comprised of 
representatives from the European Professional Football Leagues, the players 
(FIFPro Europe), the clubs (European Club Association), and the UEFA vice-
presidents.137 Also, as discussed above, clubs themselves are becoming more 
and more involved in the UEFA and take part in discussions and agreements 
on initiatives including FFP.138 
 
 129 ROBERT LANE, EC COMPETITION LAW 81 (2000). Vertical agreements are agreements between 
different levels of the production chain. Id. at 92. Horizontal agreements are agreements between different 
entities at the same level of the production chain. Id. at 82.  
 130 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 47, 88.  
 131 See supra Part II. 
 132 See LANE, supra note 129, at 67 n.85, 68 n.93.  
 133 See id. 
 134 Id. at 67. 
 135 See KORAH, supra note 125, at 49, 51; supra Part I.C. FFP is an express written agreement approved 
on by many of the necessary organizations, with a sanction-loss of a license if not complied with. Financial 
fair play: all you need to know, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.uefa.org/ 
community/news/newsid=2064391.html. 
 136 See supra Part I.A.i. 
 137 Green light for Financial Fair Play, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS (Sept. 5, 2009), http://www. 
uefa.org/stakeholders/professionalfootballstrategycouncil/news/newsid=879610.html. 
 138 See supra Part I.A.i. 
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Therefore, FFP is easily considered collusion between undertakings, as the 
different football associations and clubs approve of the agreement, the FFP 
regulations. 
B. The Agreement Affects Trade among Member States 
For FFP to violate Article 101(1), this agreement must affect the freedom 
of trade among member states.139 First, to prove that FFP is affecting trade, the 
markets must be examined to see how the agreement affected the markets.140 
The European Court of Justice set the standard for the existence of such 
agreements in Société Technique Minière.141 The analysis has two factors. 
First, the agreement must be examined to see if it is “capable of constituting a 
threat to freedom of trade between Member States in a manner which might 
harm the attainment of the objectives of a single market between the Member 
States.”142 Second, the agreement must be analyzed to see if it “may have an 
influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between 
Member States.”143 An agreement need not currently affect the pattern of trade, 
but merely have the potential to do so. 
This is not a difficult requirement. If the parties—the many national 
football associations and clubs—to the agreement are in more than one 
member state there is little chance that the agreement does not affect trade 
among the member states of the European Union.144 As the UEFA is a 
European-wide organization, and the members of the football associations and 
clubs regularly do business amongst themselves through the buying and selling 
of players, or through playing each other, it is clear that FFP will have an 
influence on the pattern of trade between member states. Due to the amount of 
economic activity among the clubs scattered throughout Europe, there is little 
to no chance that FFP would not meet this requirement.145 
 
 139 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 47, 88.  
 140 See LUIS O. BLANCO, MARKET POWER IN EU ANTITRUST LAW 28 n.45 (Andrew Read trans., 2012). 
 141 LANE, supra note 129, at 68–69. 
 142 Case 22/78, Hugin v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 1870; see LANE, supra note 129, at 68. 
 143 Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm, 1966 E.C.R. 236. 
 144 See LANE, supra note 129, at 70. 
 145 See supra Part I.B. 
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C. The Agreement Has the Object or Effect of the Prevention, Restriction or 
Distortion of Competition 
Article 101(1) states that an agreement is illegal if it has the “object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal 
market.”146 Thus, even if an agreement does not manage to affect competition, 
but the object of the agreement was to do so, then Article 101(1) declares the 
agreement illegal. Similarly, an agreement that is completely innocent when 
made, but has the effect of restricting competition, is illegal. This is the 
essential core of Article 101(1).147 
Article 101(1) holds illegal any agreement that prevents, restricts or distorts 
competition within the EU through object or effect and, therefore, FFP will be 
analyzed first to see if it distorts competition by the object. If FFP is found not 
to hurt competition by object, FFP must be analyzed to see if it affects 
competition by effect. 
1. Affecting Competition by Object 
When determining whether an agreement prevents, restricts, or distorts 
competition by object, there is no requirement to look at the concrete effects of 
the agreement.148 According to the Court of Justice in Consten and Grundig v 
Commission, if the agreement has the potential to restrict competition, then that 
is sufficient.149 Agreements that affect competition by object are agreements 
that, by their very nature, have the potential to restrict competition.150 If, by 
merely looking at the agreement, an anticompetitive objective is shown, that 
agreement affects competition by object. This could be seen as very similar to 
a quick look approach in American antitrust law. There are several types of 
agreements that the Court of Justice has held to be restricting competition by 
object, including certain agreements that have hard core effects, such as price-
fixing, export bans, and absolute territorial protection.151 
 
 146 Commission Notice 2014/C291/08, 2014 O.J. (C 291) 1. 
 147 KORAH, supra note 125, at 66–67; LANE, supra note 129, at 79. 
 148 Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Établissements Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 299. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Commission Notice 2004/C101/08, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 97, 100. 
 151 EU reforms for distribution agreements—what do they mean for business?, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT 
(Oct. 2009), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/30076/eu-reforms-for-distribution-
agreements-what-do-they-mean-for-business. 
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There are a number of factors that the Commission suggests to analyze if 
an agreement affects competition by object.152 These factors consist of: (1) the 
content of the agreement and the objective aims pursued by it; (2) the context 
in which it is to be applied and the actual conduct and behavior of the parties 
on the market; and (3) an examination of the facts underlying the agreement 
and the specific circumstances in which it operates may be required.153 
a. Content and Intent of Agreement 
When just looking at the content of FFP and the objectives UEFA outlined, 
it is clear that FFP could be violating Article 101(1). UEFA outright admits 
that it has an anti-competitive intent in part with establishing FFP 
regulations.154 The second principal objective states that UEFA intends “to 
decrease pressure on salaries and transfer fees and limit inflationary effect.”155 
It seems clear that UEFA has a blatant anti-competitive objective in attempting 
to affect the salary, and transfer fee market. 
b. Restoring National Divisions 
Another argument of how FFP violates Article 101(1) by object is that FFP 
creates absolute territorial protection by the way FFP regulates the conduct and 
behavior on the market, which is violating Article 101(1) by object. The Court 
of Justice in FA Premier League v QC Leisure held that an agreement that 
might restore the divisions between national markets must be regarded as an 
agreement whose objective is to restrict competition, within the meaning of 
Article 101(1) TFEU.”156 FFP is creating absolute territorial protection, 
because the regulations are creating an entrenching of the market, which would 
restore the divisions of the national markets. 
Entrenching the markets was not UEFA’s objective with FFP, but although 
intention may be taken into consideration, intention is not required when 
determining if an agreement restricts competition by object.157 Even with 
 
 152 See generally Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU (formerly Article 81(3) TEC), 
EUR-LEX (Feb. 21, 2011), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1415491584638&uri= 
URISERV:l26114. 
 153 Id. ¶ 22. 
 154 Stephen Weatherill, Financial Fair Play and the law Part III: Guest post by Professor Stephen 
Weatherill, SOCCERNOMICS (May 14, 2013), http://www.soccernomics-agency.com/?p=469. 
 155 Financial Fair Play, supra note 18. 
 156 Case C-403/08, Football Ass’n Premier League v. QC Leisure, 2011 E.C.R. 0000 para. 247. 
 157 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 81 (citing Case C-551/03P, Gen. Motors v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-3173 
paras. 77–78). 
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legitimate objections, an agreement may be viewed as having a restrictive 
objective if that objective restricts the competitiveness of the market.158 To 
determine if FFP will restore the divisions of the national markets, there must 
be an analysis of how the market would have been with no agreement, and how 
the market looks after the agreement.159 
To perform this analysis, one must first define the market. As stated above, 
the market here should be defined as European football club competitions.160 
To analyze if the agreement restricts competition by object, the market will be 
looked at first without an agreement, which is essentially looking at the market 
with no FFP regulations in effect. Then the market will be looked at with FFP 
regulations in effect. 
Before FFP, clubs were allowed to transfer players with no price 
restrictions.161 This allowed owners of clubs to put as much of their personal 
money as they pleased into the club. For example, Manchester City, owned by 
Abu Dhabi United Group, invested their personal money into the club, 
specifically the players.162 Their personal investment was over €235 million.163 
This investment allowed Manchester City to climb from 19th place in revenues 
of football clubs worldwide in the 2008/2009 season to 7th place in revenues in 
the 2011/2012 season and to sixth place in the 2012/2013 season.164 The 
investment the owners made in the playing squad allowed the club to win the 
Premier League and reach the UEFA Champions League, which has allowed 
Manchester City to increase revenue from those events without relying on the 
owners’ personal money.165 
Looking at the market after FFP regulations are placed into effect, owners 
will no longer be able to use their personal money to invest in a better playing 
 
 158 See Case C-551/03P, Gen. Motors v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-3173 para. 64. 
 159 EZRACHI, supra note 115 at 81 (citing opinion of Advocate General Roemer (Mar. 23, 1966)). 
 160 See supra text accompanying note 115. 
 161 See Dupont, supra note 90. 
 162 DELOITTE SPORTS BUS. GROUP, SPANISH MASTERS: FOOTBALL MONEY LEAGUE 25 (Mar. 2010), 
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_GB/uk/industries/sportsbusinessgroup/6a5fb29b3f907210VgnVCM100000b
a42f00aRCRD.htm [hereinafter SPANISH MASTERS]. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 6; DELOITTE SPORTS BUS. GROUP, CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY: FOOTBALL MONEY LEAGUE 8 (Jan. 
2013), http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_GB/uk/industries/sportsbusinessgroup/sports/football/deloitte-
football-money-league/c0d0cc64dac5c310VgnVCM3000003456f70aRCRD.htm; DELOITTE SPORTS BUS. 
GROUP, ALL TO PLAY FOR: FOOTBALL MONEY LEAGUE 8 (Jan. 2014), http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/Sports%20Business%20Group/uk-deloitte-sbg-dfml-
2014.pdf [hereinafter ALL TO PLAY FOR]. 
 165 See SPANISH MASTERS, supra note 162, at 25.  
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squad to reach the better leagues and increase the club’s revenue, due to the 
“break-even” principal.166 Since owners can no longer financially help the 
clubs, clubs will have a much more difficult time in reaching the league 
position that allows a club to participate in the Europa or Champions 
League.167 Those leagues have financial benefits, including millions of euros 
worth of broadcasting revenue and prize money.168 Instead the clubs are 
entrenched into the position they were at when FFP went into effect; 
Champions league clubs will have resources that other clubs cannot match.169 
The path Manchester City took to success cannot be repeated. 
The next question is whether this entrenchment at the national level 
translates into entrenching the market throughout Europe by restoring the 
national divisions. When considering owners are no longer allowed to invest 
their own money into the club or playing squad, along with the fact that UEFA 
distributes part of the broadcasting money by the population size of the country 
the club is from, FFP arguably restores national divisions.170 Distributing 
broadcasting money by country population gives certain leagues a huge 
advantage. For example, FC Porto in Portugal received €3,163,000 in 
broadcasting money, while FC Schalke 04 in Germany received €11,380,000, 
despite playing the same number of games.171 Leagues in places with large 
populations, like Germany or England, will always have an advantage over 
leagues in more sparsely populated states, like Ukraine or Scotland. Under 
FFP, the leagues with smaller populations will always have a disadvantage of 
lower broadcasting revenue, despite similar numbers of games played. In part, 
the main disadvantage will be that the clubs in the more sparsely populated 
 
 166 FFP Regulations, supra note 46, at 35–36. 
 167 The external investment Manchester City had access to, the owner’s personal money, is not allowed to 
be used to improve a club or the club’s standing. Manchester City’s path to success will not be repeated. 
Without external investment, it will be much harder for clubs to climb to the top of the domestic league and 
qualify for European football. Andrew Critchlow, Manchester City FC Have Plans for Global Brand 
Domination, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/ 
11065644/Manchester-City-FC-have-plans-for-global-brand-domination.html (describing Manchester City’s 
efforts to build an international network of teams in order to avoid FFP sanctions and remain sustainable). 
 168 See supra text accompanying notes 44–60. The prize money for the Champions League will be 
increased through 2018, due to the need of more football-related revenue. UEFA To Up Champions League 
Prize Money As Need For Income Increases In FFP Era, SPORTSBUSINESS GLOBAL (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Global/Issues/2013/10/31/International-Football/Champions-League-
money.aspx?hl=financial%20fair%20play&sc=0. 
 169 Wayne Veysey, La Liga big boys will continue to cherry-pick Premier League stars, GOAL (Feb. 10, 
2011), http://www.goal.com/en-gb/news/2896/premier-league/2011/02/10/2346282/financial-fair-play-could-
hinder-english-clubs-but-wont-stop?ICID=AR_RA_4. 
 170 See supra text accompanying notes 53–56. 
 171 Id. 
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states will not be able to afford the better players, due to the lesser amount of 
broadcasting money, thus earning less football-related revenue, which will 
make the club less competitive. With the inability of independent owners to 
invest personally into the squad, resulting in an improvement in their club 
which helps the league as a whole become stronger, this will become a 
permanent disadvantage. 
This new plan will give the stronger leagues an advantage, because the 
clubs in those leagues will have more money to invest into the players, and the 
league itself will be more attractive to players because the result of better 
players is a more competitive league. A more competitive league will attract 
more markets to sell more merchandise to, better sponsorship deals, and better 
broadcasting deals. Those leagues attracting higher revenue will have the 
advantage of always being stronger than other leagues, and it will be very 
difficult to break that deadlock.172 The combination of the break-even principal 
and broadcasting money by the population size of the country makes the 
“interpenetration of national markets more difficult,” which has been found 
illegal in FA Premier League v QC Leisure.173 
Some markets, divided by country, will always be stronger than others, 
causing those markets to be more attractive to the consumers.174 The weaker 
leagues will no longer have the ability to slowly change into a stronger 
league.175 Since the leagues are divided by country, certain nations’ leagues 
 
 172 Malaga’s new owners have plenty of money to invest into their squad, but due to the break-even 
principal they are not permitted to. If owners were allowed to invest their money, Malaga could have a 
stronger squad and this would help make La Liga a more competitive and stronger league. See infra text 
accompanying notes 194–200. 
 173 Case C-403/08, Football Ass’n Premier League v. QC Leisure, 2011 E.C.R. 0000 para. 247. 
 174 The more attractive leagues, such as the Premier League or La Liga, have more people buying tickets 
and merchandise, which feeds even more money into those markets. Also, since more people are watching 
those leagues, sponsorships and broadcasting deals are worth more and bring more money into those markets 
that can be spent on high-value players, which make those leagues even more attractive to consumers. It is a 
re-enforcing cycle. See Generally Spanish Masters, supra note 162; All to Play For, supra note 164; supra text 
accompanying notes 174–175. 
 175 As seen in the past few years, Ligue 1, the top French league, has become stronger, in part because of 
the investment in Paris Saint-Germain FC. As that club became stronger there has been increased interest in 
Ligue 1, which brings more merchandise sales, and higher broadcasting deals. However, Ligue 1 is stopped 
from becoming any stronger due to FFP. Monaco FC was recently bought by billionaire Dmitry Rybolovlev 
who has invested heavily into the clubs. This past season, 2013/2014, Monaco FC returned to the top tier, 
Ligue 1. The amount Dmitry Rybolovlev invested into the club by buying a better squad will not meet the FFP 
requirements. Monaco FC will not play European football this season, however, the club it is likely to qualify 
for European football sooner than later, as Monaco FC is currently second in the league. Under FFP, Monaco 
FC will be denied a UEFA license to play in the Champions League. Because of FFP, Ligue 1 cannot 
transition into a stronger league. Under FFP, clubs in Ligue 1 are forbidden from external investment. Without 
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will continue to be the big, most competitive leagues, while other nations’ 
leagues will stay small, and less competitive.176 
In a sense, the separation of the big leagues from the smaller leagues will 
restore the divisions of the national markets over the EU common market since 
a dynamic of small markets versus bigger markets will be created, or 
minimally it will create some sort of barrier between markets. The barrier 
created between markets will be based on which markets (leagues) can afford 
what type of players and which markets clearly cannot afford certain players; 
this is not a common market. 
Separating different national markets is frustrating the objective of the 
Treaty to integrate into a single economic market. By creating barriers between 
markets, FFP is restricting the market by object, which is violating Article 
101(1). This is a potential argument that could be used to prove that FFP is 
violating Article 101(1), however, it is clear that FFP affects competition by 
effect under Article 101(1) by actual tangible effects on the market. 
2. Affecting Competition by Effect 
If the argument that FFP is affecting competition by object is not 
convincing to the court, then the FFP agreement must be analyzed to determine 
if and how it is affecting competition by effect.177 When analyzing an 
agreement to determine if the agreement is “preventing, restricting or distorting 
 
external investment, clubs cannot strengthen, which has the effect of not allowing the league as a whole to 
grow into a more competitive league. Because of the effects of FFP, Ligue 1 always will be considered a 
weaker league then La Liga or the English Premier League. Jonathan Johnson, Why French Ligue 1 Deserves 
More of Our Attention, BLEACHER REP. (Jan. 18, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1490231-why-
french-ligue-1-deserves-more-of-our-attention/; Christopher Almeras, Could Ligue 1’s Growing South 
American Influence Change the French Game?, BLEACHER REP. (Sept. 12, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/ 
articles/1331836-could-ligue-1s-growing-south-american-influence-change-the-french-game; Owen Gibson, 
Jury remains out on Michel Platini’s financial fair play project, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www. 
theguardian.com/football/blog/2013/aug/05/michel-platini-financial-fair-play. 
 176 The English Premier League is considered the strongest and most competitive league in Europe. The 
top Spanish league, La Liga, is also considered one of the strongest leagues, due to its consistent strong 
showing in European competitions. Some of the weaker leagues include the Scottish top league, because 
traditionally there were only two clubs who would win the league, Celtic, or Rangers FC. The top French 
league, Ligue 1, is considered a weaker league, as few of the clubs have consistent strong results in European 
football. However, Ligue 1 is considered stronger than leagues like the Scottish League, as the domestic clubs’ 
competition is much more difficult. Andrew McNair, Top Ten European Leagues: And No.1 is Not The 
English Premier League, BLEACHER REP. (Jan. 15, 2001), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/326726-top-ten-
European-leagues-and-no1-is-not-the-english-premier-league/. 
 177 See supra text accompanying note 147. 
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competition by effect,” potential and actual effects must be analyzed.178 The 
Commission has recommended that when analyzing this, it is helpful to look at 
the “negative effects on prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality of 
goods and services can be expected with a reasonable degree of probability.”179 
The Court of Justice has held that there are two steps to be followed to 
analyze if there is an effect on competition.180 First, the market must be 
defined.181 As mentioned above, the market here is Europe-wide club football 
competition.182 This step therefore will not be discussed further here. Second, 
it is necessary to analyze if the agreement impedes access to the market.183 To 
determine if the agreement impedes access to the market, the legal and 
economic effect of the agreement must be analyzed.184 
There are a number of factors that the Court of Justice has recommended to 
look at to analyze if the agreement impedes access to the market.185 Some of 
these factors are: (1) the opportunity to access the market; (2) the conditions 
under which competitive forces operate on the relevant market; and (3) if it is 
difficult to access market, whether the agreement contributes to the cumulative 
effect produced by the totality of the similar contracts in that market.186 Again, 
to conduct this analysis the market must be analyzed with FFP, as opposed to 
how the market would be operating without FFP; the factors mentioned above 
will be used in this analysis.187 The agreement must be looked at in an 
economic context.188 
This analysis will be accomplished by looking at different aspects of the 
business of football and how FFP will affect each aspect. First, this Part will 
analyze how investments can be made by owners in their club. The second 
aspect of football business that will be analyzed is the transfer market. The 
third aspect is how FFP will affect the players’ wages and clubs’ status. 
 
 178 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 83 (citing Communication from the Commission, 2004 O.J. (C 101/08)). 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 85 (citing Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG, 1991 E.C.R. I-935). 
 181 Id. (citing Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG, 1991 E.C.R. I-935 paras. 16–18). 
 182 See supra text accompanying notes 115–18. 
 183 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 85 (citing Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG, 1991 
E.C.R. I-935 para. 19). 
 184 KORAH, supra note 125, at 61. 
 185 Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG, 1991 E.C.R. I-935 paras. 20, 22, 24. 
 186 Id. 
 187 KORAH, supra note 125, at 62. 
 188 Id. 
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a. Investments Made by Owners 
FFP will force clubs to break even on their balance sheets, and this will 
have a major effect on the market as owners can no longer invest their own 
money into clubs, as discussed above.189 FFP has an effect on how much 
money clubs can spend on players, and if clubs do not reach Champions 
League level, this could potentially force teams to sell players to have the 
money for the transfer funds for newer players, or to just break even.190 Before, 
teams did not have to think about those restrictions. If a team failed to reach 
Champions League, but the owner had the money to invest in the player squad, 
it was a viable and smart option for the team to improve through the owner’s 
investment of his personal money.191 Restricting investments will cause small 
clubs to stay small, and big clubs to stay big eliminating competition between 
the different types of clubs. 
Under FFP, an owner personally investing his or her own money is no 
longer an option.192 With this lack of ability to invest, small clubs will stay 
small and no longer be able to jump from being a mid-table team to a team that 
can compete consistently in UEFA’s European championships.193 Before FFP 
took effect, Manchester City’s owners personally invested over $1 billion into 
the squad turning the club who finished in tenth place in 2008/2009 season to a 
team who won the Premier League and have been in the top three for the last 
four seasons.194 However, the Manchester City’s club accounts showed that the 
club lost $255 million between 2011 and 2013.195 
This will not happen again. Just look at Malaga CF, owned by billionaire 
Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser Al-Thani, who has invested over €190 million in 
the club between 2010 and 2012.196 In December 2013, UEFA banned Malaga 
 
 189 See supra text accompanying notes 90–91; FFP Regulations, supra note 46, at 36. 
 190 See Failure to Qualify for the Champions League Would Force Club to Sell Players to Generate 
Transfer Funds for Targets Following Implementation of New UEFA Spending Rules, GOAL (Apr. 25, 2011) 
http://www.goal.com/en-gb/news/2896/premier-league/2011/04/25/2457202/manchester-city-set-to-curb-
spending-this-summer-to-comply?ICID=AR_RA_1. 
 191 See SPANISH MASTERS, supra note 162, at 25. 
 192 See FFP Regulations, supra note 46, at 36. 
 193 See Dupont, supra note 90. 
 194 Ishaan Tharoor, Four Ways English Champions Manchester City Reflect the New World Order, WASH. 
POST (May 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/05/12/4-ways-english-
champions-manchester-city-reflect-the-new-world-order/. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Dermint Corrigan, Malaga expect UEFA ban to be overturned, ESPN FC (Jan. 2, 2013), http://espnfc. 
com/news/story?id=1285415&cc=5901. 
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from all European competitions and fined the club €300,000 because the club 
was overdue on repaying debt to Spanish tax authorities and other clubs.197 By 
the time the ruling was made, Malaga was back on sound financial grounds.198 
Instead, the over-payables principal, Articles 65 and 66, were violated.199 Now 
instead of Malaga being a more competitive team and making La Liga more 
competitive, the club was banned from participating in the UEFA league this 
season, and forced to sell one of its breakout young players, Isco.200 If FFP was 
not in effect, Malaga’s owner could have retained one of the club’s star 
players, bought more star players, and increased the club’s standing in La Liga 
and potentially placed better than the quarterfinals Champions League finish 
from last season.201 But due to FFP, this is not an option to Malaga CF, unlike 
when Manchester City had the option less than a decade earlier. 
This example of Manchester City before FFP, and Malaga CF after FFP 
shows clear anticompetitive effects of the FFP regulations. The regulations 
restrict investments. By restricting investments, smaller clubs can no longer 
invest in long-term success.202 The result of the restricting small clubs’ ability 
to invest in long-term success adversely affects the competition balance, 
because under FFP, the club’s success is determined through initial success, 
and the market size of the club.203 To offset those factors to compete with those 
clubs that already have a high market share and success in European football, a 
club needs external investment.204 Under FFP rules, there is no external 
investment allowed.205 
If a club does not have the reputation of clubs like Liverpool, Barcelona, 
Manchester United or AC Milan to receive profit from merchandise or tickets 
 
 197 Jonathan Howard, Malaga’s Appeal Loss is a UEFA Financial Fair Play Win, BUS. OF SOCCER, (June 
13, 2013), http://www.businessofsoccer.com/2013/06/13/malagas-appeal-loss-is-uefa-financial-fair-play-win/; 
Jonathan Howard, Malaga: Scapegoat Or First FFP Trophy, BUS. OF SOCCER (May 24, 2013), http://www. 
businessofsoccer.com/2013/05/24/malaga-scapegoat-or-first-ffp-trophy/. 
 198 Corrigan, supra note 196. 
 199 See FFP Regulations, supra note 46, at 39–41. 
 200 Jerrad Peters, How the likes of Chelsea, City, PSG and Monaco Can Escape FFP Sanction, BLEACHER 
REP. (June 13, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1672084-how-the-likes-of-chelsea-city-psg-and-
monaco-can-escape-ffp-sanction. 
 201 Id. 
 202 HENNING VOPEL, IS FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REALLY JUSTIFIED? AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ASSESSMENT OF UEFA’S FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY RULES 11 (2013). 
 203 Id. The initial success leads to more broadcasting and prize money, while market size leads to more 
merchandise sales, and the ability to increase prices. Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 FFP Regulations, supra note 46, art. 61. 
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on its name alone,206 it must depend solely on its success in competitions to 
gain financial awards.207 The club must gain a reputation and a larger market 
share through being successful in competitions like Manchester City. 
Manchester City used to be a local team with limited international appeal.208 
Once it began to succeed due to the owner’s investments, it slowly grew to 
have international appeal and developed a fan base. Manchester City now 
receives large amounts of football-revenue due to its current reputation, one 
that could not have been achieved without external investment.209 
A club will not be able to achieve the type of success it needs to reach a 
higher level, because without the financial awards from being successful in 
competitions or from its reputation, a club will not have enough football 
related revenue to be able to afford good players. Clubs will be fixed in what 
kinds of leagues and markets, they can compete in; this adversely affects 
competition. 
Additionally, restricting investments will also entrench which leagues are 
big, and which leagues are small because the market size of different leagues 
will be fixed.210 Customers will naturally watch the bigger leagues, and the 
market size will be fixed in time. Without a larger market size and the benefits 
of a larger market, as well as increased broadcasting revenue and larger 
sponsorships, clubs in smaller leagues will not be able to improve and achieve 
a higher UEFA coefficient.211 The result of a higher UEFA coefficient is more 
 
 206 Another example is how Manchester United failed to qualify for the Champions League for the 
2014/2015 season and lost that income. However, in July 2014, Manchester United signed a world-record £47 
million-per-year shirt sponsorship deal with Chevrolet. Manchester United was able to sign a high value deal 
due to its globally-known reputation, despite having its worst season in decades. Due to the deal, Manchester 
United will only have a net loss of $35 million instead of $55 million. See Mike Ozanian, The World’s Most 
Valuable Soccer Teams, FORBES.COM (May 7, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2014/05/07/ 
the-worlds-most-valuable-soccer-teams-3/; Alex Miller and Nick Harris, Man Utd’s Chevrolet deal pushes 
Premier League shirt values to £191m, SPORTINGINTELLIGENCE.COM (July 28, 2014), http://www. 
sportingintelligence.com/2014/07/28/man-utds-chevrolet-deal-pushes-premier-league-shirt-values-to-191m-
280701/.  
 207 For example, in Turkey, Galatasaray achieved its second-consecutive domestic title in the 2012/2013 
season and made it to the quarter-finals of the Champions League and used this success to sign new 
sponsorships with Opel, W Collection and HCL Infosystems. See Ozanian, supra note 206. 
 208 See Tharoor, supra note 194. 
 209 Id. 
 210 See supra Part.III.A.ii.a.  
 211 UEFA coefficient is based on how well each league club places in European football the year before. 
Clubs within leagues with more broadcasting revenue and larger sponsorships and thus higher football revenue 
will have more resources to invest in a better playing squad and place higher in the competitions, which will 
give those leagues a higher coefficient and more European football spots the next year. See generally UEFA 
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club places in European football, which results in the financial awards that 
come with those competitions. These received financial awards allow clubs to 
sustain their success by strengthening their leagues. 
The result of restricting investments entrenches the market within each 
league, and also entrenches which leagues are big, and which leagues are 
small. FFP impedes the access to the market-Europe-wide club competitions. 
FFP is restricting or distorting competition by actual effect. 
b. Transfer Market 
i. Restricting Transfer Prices Artificially 
FFP will negatively affect the conditions in which competitive forces are 
allowed to operate on the relevant market. The conditions in which forces are 
allowed to operate are one of the factors the Court of Justice takes into account 
when determining the effect of an agreement on the market.212 FFP will not 
only entrench the market, but its break-even principle will affect the supply 
and demand of the transfer market. The break-even principle establishes a 
capped number of how much each team can spend,213 which is essentially an 
artificial ceiling on the demand allowed in the market. The artificial ceiling 
does not reflect the amount club owners are willing to put into the market.214 
Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) admitted that its interest in signing Angel Di Maria 
ended during the 2014 summer transfer window because the transfer price 
would be too expensive under Financial Fair Play restrictions, not because the 
club lacked the money to spend.215 Therefore, Manchester United signed Di 
Maria without any real competition that would have increased his transfer 
fee.216 This restricted Di Maria’s transfer fee artificially. 
 
Rankings, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, http://www.uefa.com/memberassociations/uefarankings/ 
country/index.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 212 See supra Part II. 
 213 FFP Regulations, supra note 46, art. 61. 
 214 See Mourinho: FFP Prevented Striker Moves, ESPNFC.COM (Feb. 11, 2014), http://espnfc.com/news/ 
story/_/id/1711663/chelsea-boss-jose-mourinho-ffp-prevented-edinson-cavani-radamel-falcao-moves?cc= 
5901. 
 215 See Tom Conn, PSG Deem Angel Di Maria as “Too Expensive,” INSIDESPANISHFOOTBALL.COM 
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.insidespanishfootball.com/119482/psg-deem-angel-di-maria-as-too-expensive/. 
 216 See Amlan Majumdar, Manchester United Move Ahead Of PSG In The Race To Sign Di Maria, 
HARDTACKEL.COM (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.thehardtackle.com/2014/manchester-united-move-ahead-of-
psg-in-the-race-to-sign-di-maria/. 
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Additionally, in the summer 2014 transfer window, Manchester City’s 
inability to sign Radamel Falcao came down to the FFP regulations, 
specifically the need to balance the books. The decision was not based on 
whether the club wanted or could afford the player.217 FFP artificially limits 
the demand on the transfer market. 
Since the demand of the market will be artificially limited, the amount paid 
for transfers, and the player’s salaries, will also be restricted artificially.218 
UEFA has even admitted that “decreas[ing] pressure on salaries and transfer 
fees and limit inflationary effect” is one of the principal objectives of this 
agreement.219 The result of the capped demand will be fewer transfers.220 Since 
there are fewer transfers taking place, there are fewer transfers agents can 
make a profit from. The transfers that do happen will be at a lower monetary 
amount than before FFP regulations.221 During the summer transfer window in 
2013, FFP prevented Chelsea FC from buying two key players, Radamel 
Falcao and Edinson Cavani. The manager, Jose Mourinho, said that FFP ended 
the club’s interest in these two players who moved to other clubs over the 2013 
summer transfer window. Before FFP, the billionaire owner, Roman 
Abramovich, would have been free to personally invest in those players.222 
FFP negatively affects the competitive conditions of the market because the 
regulations cap the monetary amount and thus limit the ability to compete. The 
artificial ceiling limiting the demand and supply of the market is one of the 
strongest arguments that FFP affects competition, and is therefore illegal under 
Article 101(1). 
 
 217 Zach Woosley, Manchester City working against time, financial rules to sign Radamel Falcao, SB 
NATION (Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/soccer/2014/8/31/6090237/manchester-city-radamel-
falcao-transfer-rumor-as-monaco; Transfer Deadline Day: 10 Biggest Premier League Moves That Could 
Happen, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/picturegalleries/11067290/ 
Transfer-deadline-day-10-biggest-Premier-League-moves-that-could-happen.html; see Tom Sheen, Transfer 
deadline day: Alvaro Negredo could move from Manchester City to Valencia, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 1, 2014), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/transfers/transfer-deadline-day-alvaro-negredo-could-move-from-
manchester-city-to-valencia-9703059.html. 
 218 VOPEL, supra note 202, at 15–16. 
 219 Financial Fair Play, supra note 65. 
 220 Matt Slater, How Bosman’s Lawyer is Plotting Another Football Revolution, BBC (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/24333604. 
 221 Mourinho: FFP Prevented Striker Moves, supra note 214. 
 222 See id. 
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ii. Creating an Oligopoly Market 
FFP also negatively affects the conditions in which competitive forces are 
allowed to operate on the market through a combination of the break-even 
principal and UEFA’s public financial data exchange. Together, these two 
principals allow big clubs to stay big. FFP causes a self-perpetrating spiral of 
dominance, which could potentially form an “oligolpoly” in European 
football.223 
In a highly oligopolistic market, such as European club football, there is a 
potential for a concentrated market because the same clubs would be 
competing. If European football becomes an oligopolistic market, then there is 
concern about the financial data clubs exchange through UEFA and how it 
affects the conditions the competitive forces are allowed to operate on the 
market. 
FFP regulations require clubs to provide financials to UEFA. UEFA then 
releases this information to the public in an annual report.224 This process has a 
potentially anti-competitive effect, similar to the anti-competitive effect found 
in T-Mobile Netherlands and Others.225 The Court of Justice in T-Mobile 
Netherlands and Others discussed how an exchange of information about 
market positions and strategies of their competitors reduced the degree of 
uncertainty as to the operation of the market. The Court also discussed how 
this restriction is illegal under Article 101(1).226 If the exchange of information 
is capable of removing strategic uncertainties, it restricts the competition even 
if the information is public.227 Frequent exchanges of information that creates a 
better understanding of the market and a monitoring of deviations results in a 
collusive outcome.228 
To decide if an exchange of information is restricting the market, it must 
first be determined whether FFP regulations will cause an oligopoly. Above, it 
is discussed how there is a self-perpetrating spiral of dominance, and that this 
arguably could cause an oligopoly. However, a counter-argument is that both 
small and big clubs have agreed to follow the FFP regulations, and that it is not 
 
 223 VOPEL, supra note 202, at 15–16. 
 224 See BENCHMARKING REPORT, supra note 17, at 115. 
 225 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 145 (citing Case C-8/ 08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others v Raad 
van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009, C.M.L.R. 110). 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id.; Communication from the Commission (EC) No. 14.1.11, art. 93, 2011 O.J. (C 11/1). 
 228 Id. ¶ 91. 
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an oligopolistic market if all clubs and national associations agree.229 The 
success of this argument will be depend on how the Court views the economic 
effect of FFP on the market—whether the Court sees the economic effects of 
FFP as resulting in an oligopolistic European club football market. 
If it is decided that European club football is an oligopolistic market, the 
next step is to determine whether the break-even principal and the information 
UEFA publicly distributes in its benchmarking report removes a great deal of 
uncertainty from the market.230 UEFA specifically references and distributes 
the net earnings, wages and other personnel costs, long-term investments costs, 
operating costs, and revenue streams of the top twenty-five ranked clubs in 
UEFA.231 This public information, in combination with the break-even 
principle, and the limit on the maximum amount a club can spend, can lead to 
educated guesses on how much money a club could potentially spend on 
transfer fees and new player wages. Because owners are not allowed to inject 
their own money into the market, uncertainties are removed in the transfer 
market. 
In Vereeniging Van Cementhandelaren v Commission, the Court of Justice 
decided that fixing a price “affects competition because it enables all the 
participants to predict with a reasonable degree of certainty what the pricing 
policy pursued by their competitors will be.”232 The fixing of a price here is the 
break-even principal, which is the maximum price that teams can pay. There 
will be a reasonable certainty of what transfer policy each club will undertake 
during each transfer window. Clubs will be aware of how much other clubs can 
pay, and it is often known or released what type of players clubs are looking 
for.233 In addition, fixing the price will create reasonable certainty that clubs 
will have to sell players in order to comply with FFP regulations. For example, 
when Manchester City attempted to buy Radamel Falcao in the 2014 summer 
 
 229 See supra Part I.B.ii. 
 230 UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, BENCHMARKING REPORT ON THE CLUBS QUALIFIED AND LICENSED 
TO COMPETE IN THE UEFA COMPETITION SEASON 2013/14 (2013), http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/ 
Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/01/99/91/07/1999107_DOWNLOAD.pdf. 
 231 Id. at 3, 34–50. Of course, the oligarchy could be considered a smaller number of these twenty-five 
clubs. 
 232 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 133 (citing Case 8/72, Vereeniging Van Cementhandelaren v. 
Commission, 1973, E.C.R. 977 at para. 21). 
 233 As in any sport, there is speculation of what players are needed due to gaps in the team during the 
previous season or other players leaving the team requiring the team to look for replacements. Also, transfer 
fees are almost always released to the public. See generally Transfer deadline day: Radamel Falcao, Daley 
Blind and Danny Welbeck moves—live!, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/football/ 
live/2014/sep/01/transfer-deadline-day-live. 
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transfer window, it was known that Manchester City would have to sell other 
players in order to comply with FFP.234 Pundits were also certain which 
players would be sold.235 If Manchester City was able to sign Falcao, other 
clubs would have known exactly what price Manchester City would have to 
sell the other players and would likely pay no more than that price. This 
certainty will have a deflationary effect on the level of players’ transfer fees, 
which consequently will have a deflationary effect on the revenues of players’ 
agents.236 
FFP makes this possible by requiring teams to report all financials.237 If 
FFP just required clubs to report the debts the club is accountable for, there 
may be a different outcome, which will be discussed later in this Comment.238 
When only debts are reported, it is more difficult to make an educated guess 
about the break-even point for a club. It is the combination of the break-even 
principal and the public report of all club financials that removes the 
uncertainties from the market and creates a deflationary effect on the transfer 
market. UEFA has even admitted that “decreas[ing] pressure on salaries and 
transfer fees and limit[ing] inflationary effect” is one of the principal 
objectives of this agreement.239 This objective has a negative impact on 
competition. 
C. Effect on Players’ Wages and Clubs’ Ability to Compete 
One of FFP’s objectives is to limit the inflation of players’ wages.240 
However, FFP will actually lower players’ wages.241 Players will be worse off 
under FFP because their salaries will be capped at the amount that FFP allows 
clubs to spend, which cannot exceed the football-related revenue.242 As a 
 
 234 In part this was due to Manchester City being forced to comply with FFP sanctions of how much they 
could spend in the summer transfer window. Regardless, of the sanction it still would have been estimated by 
pundits of how much and who Manchester City would have to sell to buy Falcao. See Woosley, supra note 
217. 
 235 Id.; Rob Pollard, Radamel Falcao Replacing Alvaro Negredo Would Improve Manchester City, 
BLEACHER REP. (Aug. 31, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2182208-radamel-falcao-replacing-alvaro-
negredo-would-improve-manchester-city. 
 236 Ed Thompson, Legal Challenge to UEFA FFP Rules by ‘Bosman’ Lawyer, FIN. FAIR PLAY (May 9, 
2013), http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/latest-news/legal-challenge-to-uefa-ffp-rules-by-bosman-lawyer. 
 237 FFP Regulations, supra note 46. 
 238 Infra Part V. 
 239 See UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, http://www.uefa.org/protecting-the-game/club-licensing-and-
financial-fair-play/index.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2014). 
 240 VOPEL, supra note 202, at 13. 
 241 Thompson, supra note 88. 
 242 VOPEL, supra note 202, at 14; FFP Regulations, supra note 46, art. 61. 
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result, smaller clubs will be unable to afford higher wage players. Additionally, 
since there is a limited number of big clubs, there will only be so much 
football-related revenue with which to pay the players, and this will further 
restrict wages.243 Overall, there will be a net decline in the wage payroll.244 It 
has been estimated that FFP will lower wages fourteen to twenty-three 
percent.245 The market for players’ wages will have an artificial ceiling.246 
In addition, FFP essentially places a limitation on the demand for players; 
FFP caps the demand for players by only allowing clubs to pay for players 
with football-related revenue.247 Chelsea FC manager Jose Mourinho admitted 
that FFP was the reason Chelsea FC chose to not pursue certain players during 
the 2013 summer transfer window.248 In the 2014 summer transfer window, 
Paris Saint-Germain declined to sign Angel Di Maria, because the requested 
transfer price was too expensive under FFP.249 Clubs will now only be able to 
buy a limited number of players in the transfer window. This number will 
depend on how many players they can sell and if they can make any profit on 
those players.250 Thus, there will be fewer transfers.251 This re-enforcing cycle 
will lessen the demand for players artificially, which will affect the money 
agents received from transfers. The re-enforcing cycle of clubs wanting 
players, but unable to buy them and stay in conformity with FFP will affect the 
small clubs more than big clubs, because big clubs will have more football-
related revenue to spend.252 This creates an unequal market for the best 
 
 243 VOPEL, supra note 202, at 11. 
 244 Thomas Peeters & Stefan Szymanski, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS IN SOCCER: FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY AND 
THE ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE 25 (2012), http://www.soccernomics-agency.com/wordpress/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/01/Peeters-Szymanski-Financial-Fair-Play-WP.pdf. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Chelsea FC manager, Jose Mourinho, admitted that a player’s wage is a factor when deciding to buy a 
player, due to the financial restrictions from FFP. Additionally, Manchester United has a policy to include a 
pay cut of up to 25% if the club fails to qualify for the Champions League. Manchester United introduced this 
policy in 2011. This policy was most likely introduced to make sure that Manchester United can meet the 
break-even provision. See Mourinho: FFP Prevented Striker Moves, supra note 214; ManU Players Could 
Face Wage Drop If Club Fails To Qualify For Champions League, SPORTSBUSINESS GLOBAL (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Global/Issues/2014/01/10/Finance/ManU-
Wages.aspx?hl=financial%20fair%20play&sc=0. 
 247 VOPEL, supra note 202, at 13–14. 
 248 Mourinho, supra note 214. 
 249 Conn, supra note 215. 
 250 If a player increases in value between acquiring and selling the player, FFP will consider that football-
related revenue. See Vopel, supra note 202, at 13–14. 
 251 Matt Slater, How Bosman’s lawyer is plotting another football revolution, BBC (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/24333604. 
 252 The big clubs will earn more football related revenue, so those clubs will be able to spend more money 
under the break-even provision. See supra Part I.C. 
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players, a market that makes it impossible for small clubs to compete with the 
big clubs. The way the owners’ of Manchester City or Chelsea FC used their 
personal money to invest in long-term success for their club is no longer an 
option.253 The competitive balance of this market is weakened, as the smaller 
clubs are forbidden to compete with clubs that have access to the wealth of 
European football. 
Due to a lack of external investment, smaller clubs with less football-
related revenue will never be able to afford higher wage players. Unable to 
afford higher wage or better producing players will prevent smaller clubs from 
investing in long-term success,254 since they need those higher wage and better 
quality players to reach the European club level. The smaller clubs are not able 
to catch up with the bigger clubs competing in European football, without 
some sort of external funding.255 FFP will protect the bigger clubs by letting 
only them afford better quality players.256 That is why smaller clubs like 
Southampton lose many of their star quality players to bigger clubs.257 
Under FFP, smaller clubs cannot be invested in, which weakens the 
competitive balance between clubs. Without investment, the smaller clubs 
cannot realistically compete with bigger clubs to gain spots in the higher 
revenue competitions. A gap is created between the small and big clubs of the 
league. The big clubs dominant league position will be enhanced,258 which, in 
essence, results in the smaller clubs from being able to compete. 
Due to the smaller clubs being forbidden to compete with the bigger clubs, 
there is a clear anti-competitive effect on the market and thus FFP is illegal 
under Article 101(1). 
 
 253 See supra Part III.C.ii.a. Over the last decade, Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich invested money 
into Chelsea FC to bring the club from a mid-table club to a club that consistently finishes in the top four of 
the Premier League. Bruce Buck: ‘Roman has great ambition and is as fervent a Chelsea fan as any you Will 
Meet in the Pub, THE TIMES (July 1, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/sport/football/clubs/ 
chelsea/article3804299.ece?CMP=OTH-gnws-standard-2013_06_30. 
 254 Vopel, supra note 202, at 11. 
 255 See id. at 17–18. 
 256 Simon Yeend, Now Arsene Wenger feels he’s on the money at Arsenal, EXPRESS (Aug. 2, 2014), 
http://www.express.co.uk/sport/football/494584/Now-Arsene-Wenger-feels-he-s-on-the-money-at-Arsenal. 
 257 See id. In the 2014 summer transfer window, Southampton, despite being a Premier League club, 
experienced an exodus of players searching for European-level football. Id.; see FFP to blame for 
Southampton exodus, FOOTYPLACE (July 30, 2014), http://www.footyplace.com/features/ffp-to-blame-for-
southampton-exodus-0730298110. 
 258 VOPEL, supra note 202, at 18. 
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D. Possible Defenses 
As shown above, FFP has a clear negative impact on competition. There 
are several exemptions that allow agreements that violate Article 101(1) to 
stand.259 The exemptions include the exceptions noted in Article 101(3), an 
ancillary restraint exemption, and the de minimus exemption.260 Each of these 
will be taken in turn, and will be explained why they do not apply to FFP. 
1. Article 101(3) 
Article 101(3) notes two types of exemptions that will cause agreements to 
be exempted from Article 101(1). The first exception is the vertical block 
exception. This exemption applies to only to vertical agreements.261 
For the vertical block exception to even be looked at it depends on whether 
FFP will be characterized as a vertical or horizontal agreement. Therefore, 
there first must be a discussion about whether FFP fits the characteristics of a 
vertical or horizontal agreement.262 FFP could be considered a horizontal 
agreement between suppliers—the clubs and football associations.263 While 
FFP could also be considered a horizontal agreement, it is also argued that FFP 
could be considered a vertical restraint.264 FFP would be considered a vertical 
restraint, because UEFA is more of a governing body. In 2004, UEFA imposed 
a club licensing system that requires clubs to meet a certain set of standards, 
which is characteristic of vertical restraints.265 For the vertical block exception 
to be examined, it depends on how FFP will be characterized: as a vertical or 
horizontal agreement. 
If FFP is characterized as a vertical agreement, one must look at how much 
of the market the agreement concerns.266 If the agreement concerns more than 
thirty percent of the market share, then this exception does not apply.267 Under 
 
 259 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 53–54. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Commission Regulation 330/2010, On the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 2010 O.J. 
(L 102/1) 4 [hereinafter Application of Article 101(3)]. 
 262 THOMAS PEETERS & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS IN SOCCER: FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY 
AND THE ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE 7 (Univ. of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics, Paper No. 028, 
2012). 
 263 See Weatherill, supra note 154. 
 264 PEETERS & SZYMANSKI, supra note 244, at 7. 
 265 Id. at 2. 
 266 Application of Article 101(3), supra note 261, at 2. 
 267 Id. at 6. 
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the definition of market discussed earlier in this Comment,268 FFP does affect 
more than thirty percent of the market share, as FFP and UEFA concern almost 
the totality of the European-wide club competitions.269 Therefore, the vertical 
block exemption will not apply to FFP. 
The second exemption under Article 101(3) is if the European 
Commission, National Competition Agencies, or National Courts deems an 
agreement does not violate Article 101(1) because the agreement meets four 
requirements: 
1. the agreement contributes to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or promotes technical or economic progress; 
2. allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit; 
3. does not impose restrictions which are not indispensable to the 
attainment of these objectives; 
4. does not eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question.270 
FFP fails to meet three of the four requirements. The first requirement is 
fulfilled by FFP, as one of the objectives of FFP, is to introduce more 
discipline and rationality in club football finances and to protect the long-term 
viability of European club football.271 FFP is encouraging economic progress. 
The second requirement of allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit is not met. While the club’s financial footing may be on steadier 
ground, consumers do not receive any direct benefit regarding their experience 
watching the clubs, paying for tickets, or merchandise.272 If anything, 
consumers will have to pay more for tickets or merchandise, because clubs will 
want to have more money from football-related revenue to be in conformity 
with the break-even provision.273 
 
 268 See supra Part II. 
 269 Supra Part II. 
 270 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 55. 
 271 Financial Fair Play, supra note 17. 
 272 See Jonathan Johnson, How Paris Saint-Germain and Monaco Will Beat Financial Fair Play, 
BLEACHER REP. (Aug. 28, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1753485-how-paris-saint-germain-and-
monaco-will-beat-financial-fairplay. 
 273 Id.; see also Premier League Clubs Continue Ticket Price Raises, WHEN SATURDAY COMES (July 23, 
2014), http://www.wsc.co.uk/wsc-daily/1184-july-2014/11771-premier-league-clubs-continue-ticket-price-
rises. 
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The third condition of not imposing restrictions that are indispensable to 
the attainment of these objectives is also not met. There are other less 
restrictive ways of achieving the goals of FFP without the break-even 
provision, which will be discussed later in this Comment.274 
The last requirement is that the agreement does not eliminate competition 
of a substantial part of the products in question is also not met. FFP, as 
discussed earlier, will restrict the competition between clubs of the raw goods, 
the players.275 The competition will be restricted to the few clubs who are 
already at the elite level of the Champions League football, and the break-even 
provision is preventing owners to inject their own money to compete with 
those clubs to achieve that elite level, as shown by Manchester City discussed 
earlier.276 Thus, because the FFP regulations do not meet all four requirements, 
FFP do not qualify under the vertical block exemption. 
2. Ancillary Restraint 
The second exemption that may be brought up to defend FFP is the 
ancillary restraint defense; if an agreement restrains competition, but the 
regulation is proportionate, as well as ancillary to legitimate commercial 
venture and is really necessary, then the agreement falls outside of Article 
101(1).277 This is the argument that UEFA most likely will use claim that FFP 
is legal, and is UEFA’s strongest defense. 
When determining if a regulation is an ancillary restraint, the agreement 
and its affects must be looked within the overall context of the decision by an 
association of undertakings, per Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse 
Orde van Advocaten.278 The Court needs to weigh anticompetitive effects 
against a range of non-economic policy variables, and public interest analysis 
is part of this analysis, following Wouters.279 
FFPs non-economic policy variables are FFP’s objectives to protect the 
long-term viability of European club football; to introduce more discipline and 
 
 274 See infra Part V. 
 275 See generally C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc 
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921. 
 276 See supra Part III.B.ii.a.  
 277 LANE, supra note 129, at 129. 
 278 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 103 (C-309/99, Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van 
Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. I-1577 at para. 97). 
 279 Id. at 104.  
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rationality in club football finances; and to encourage clubs to compete within 
their revenues.280 The overall objective may be inherent in the organization and 
conduct of sports; however, the FFP regulations, especially the break-even 
provision, are not inherent in the justified objective.281 FFP is not the only way 
to achieve UEFA’s objectives. There are other ways to introduce more 
discipline and rationality in club football finance, which will be discussed 
later.282 
Additionally, even if FFP was inherently part of the FFP objective, the FFP 
regulations are not proportionate. According to the Meca-Medina and Majcen 
v Commission judgment specified in regards to sporting restrictions, “the 
restrictions thus imposed by those rules must be limited to what is necessary to 
ensure the proper conduct of competitive sport,” following the less restrictive 
means necessary test in Bosman.283 The ECJ later found that if a rule is not 
required to attain a particular objective, then that rule is not necessary.284 
FFP restrictions do go beyond what is necessary for football clubs to 
conduct proper economic practices.285 For example, FFP does not allow 
owners to spend their personal money to avoid increasing the club’s debt.286 
Smaller clubs cannot invest as Manchester City did to improve their standing, 
reach European Football, and earn more money. Thus, FFP is not the least 
harmful way to achieve financial stability in football. There are alternatives 
available to achieve financial stability in football;287 FFP is overly restrictive. 
FFP is not necessary. 
While FFP is not necessary, due to the recent financial behavior of clubs,288 
their irresponsible financial behavior must be fixed through some sort of 
regulation. The stated objectives of FFP, to achieve financial stability in 
football, are legitimate and within the public interest. Lesser restrictive 
 
 280 Financial Fair Play, supra note 17. 
 281 Commission White Paper on Sport, at 14 COM (2007) 391 final (July 11, 2007), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0391en01.pdf; see EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 97 
(citing Case C-519/ 04P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission 2006 E.C.R. I-699). 
 282 Infra Part V. 
 283 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 97 (Citing Case C-519/04P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission 
2006 E.C.R. I-699 ¶ 47). 
 284 Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v. Bernard, 2010 EUR-Lex LEXIS 113 (Mar. 16, 2010) 
¶ 49–50. 
 285 Infra Part V. 
 286 See FFP Regulations, supra note 43, art. 61. 
 287 Infra Part V. 
 288 Supra Introduction. 
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regulations than FFP will fall within this exemption and should replace the 
current FFP regulations to produce financial stability desired.289 For example, 
there could be a requirement that clubs cannot have a certain amount of debt 
per season, where the club gets the money to spend is not relevant, but a club 
cannot have more than a certain amount of debt at a time. Other examples of 
lesser restrictive regulations will be expanded on later in this Comment.290 
Therefore, the ancillary restraint defense will not work. 
3. De Minimus 
The last defense that could claim that FFP does not violate Article 101(1) is 
the de minimus defense, which states that the agreement does not have an 
appreciable effect on competition or on trade between member states of the 
EU.291 If the agreement has an insignificant effect on the market, then the 
agreement does not fall under Article 101(1).292 
FFP has a strong affect on the defined market. FFP will affect every club 
that wants to play European football, because each club must meet FFP 
requirements to acquire the license needed to play European football.293 
Therefore, the de minimus defense will not apply here. 
IV. ARTICLE 102 
To infringe on Article 102, there are three elements to be satisfied. First, 
there is conduct done by a single undertaking in a dominant position.294 
Second, the conduct must affect a substantial amount of the market.295 Third, 
the undertaking, due to its dominant position, is abusively exploitative.296 Each 
of these requirements will be considered in turn. 
 
 289 Infra Part V.  
 290 Id. 
 291 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 54. 
 292 Id. at 105 (citing Joined Cases T-374, 375, 384, 388/ 94 European Night Servs. Ltd. v. Comm’n 1998 
ECR II-3141 ¶ 102).  
 293 Supra Part I.D.; FFP Regulations, supra note 43, at 12–13. 
 294 LANE, supra note 129, at 139.  
 295 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 166. 
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A. Single Undertaking 
Article 102 only covers unilateral conduct activity by one undertaking.297 
Recent Commission decisions have found if there is a collective dominance 
between undertakings then they are also subject to Article 102.298 Collective 
dominance may be established when two or more undertakings act together 
from one economic point of view as a collective entity.299 
UEFA can be considered an undertaking, not an association of 
undertakings because UEFA produces its own product—European Football 
competitions—as well as controls the national competitions and receives 
money from these actions.300 UEFA controls the prize money, regulations, and 
media rights to those competitions.301 Additionally, UEFA makes its own 
decisions through its congress and other committees.302 These economic 
actions and activities should be enough to declare UEFA as an undertaking 
itself, instead of an association of undertakings, due to the Court of Justice’s 
view that an undertaking is an entity that engages in an economic activity 
itself.303 
Alternatively, it can be argued that the national football associations, along 
with UEFA, have enough collective dominance to fall under Article 102. The 
Court of Justice held in Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports v Commission 
that collective dominance is when different undertakings have the same 
economic point of view and act together on a particular market as a collective 
entity.304 Additionally, the Court of Justice clarified that there must be so much 
linkage between the undertakings that the undertakings must present 
themselves on the market as a collective entity, even if there was an absence of 
agreement.305 Collective dominance can be established through the existence 
of an agreement or other links between the undertakings, or an economic 
 
 297 LANE, supra note 129, at 139–40. 
 298 Id. at 141. 
 299 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 267 (citing Joined Cases T-374, 375, 384, 388/ 94 European Night Servs.. 
Ltd. and Others v. Comm’n 1998 ECR II-3141 ¶ 102). 
 300 UEFA Champions League revenue distribution, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS (Sept. 12, 2012, 
4:15 PM), http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/news/newsid=1858497.html. 
 301 The competitions are Champions League, Europa League, the SuperCup, and various Youth 
Competitions. UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, http://www.uefa.com (last visited Dec. 15, 2014). 
 302 About UEFA, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, http://www.uefa.org/about-uefa/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
 303 Case C-67/96, Albany v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5751. 
 304 Case C-395/96, Compagnie Belge Transports v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. I-1201, 1458. 
 305 Id. 
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assessment of the structure of the market and the way in which undertakings 
interact in the market in question.306 
In this case, the undertakings establishing collective dominance would be 
the different nations’ football associations, along with UEFA. The structure of 
the market implies collective dominance, similar to Piau v Commission, where 
it was found players’ agents may be excluded from the market by FIFA if 
found to be breaking FIFA’s rules,307 similar to how this Comment discusses 
how clubs are sanctioned by UEFA if found breaking FFP regulations. UEFA 
like FIFA is “the emanation of the national associations and the clubs . . . .”308 
UEFA has power in respect of clubs’ economic activities, like FIFA; this 
market structure screams collective dominance. 
Additionally, there are many links between the football associations and 
UEFA. The purpose of UEFA is to work with and on the behalf of these 
football associations.309 In addition, for UEFA to pass any major initiatives, 
such as FFP, it must be approved by UEFA’s Executive Committee and elected 
by UEFA’s Congress, which is comprised of one member for each football 
association.310 This establishes how UEFA, an independent economic entity 
itself, is linked to the national football associations. 
Through UEFA, the football associations act together on a particular 
market as a collective entity. This is shown through the varying initiatives that 
UEFA has implemented which are identical to the initiatives individual 
national football associations have implemented.311 For example, both UEFA 
and individual football associations have been fighting racism in football.312 
UEFA has had the initiative “European Football United Against Racism” in 
2013, while England’s Football Association has the initiative “Kick it Out” for 
 
 306 Case T-193/02, Piau v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-217, 221, 236; see also Erika Szyszczak, Controlling 
Dominance in European Markets, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1738, 1769 (2010). 
 307 Piau, supra note 306, at 221. 
 308 Id. at 252. 
 309 Overview, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, http://www.uefa.org/about-uefa/history/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2014).  
 310 About UEFA, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, http://www.uefa.org/about-uefa/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
 311 Race Equality, THE FOOTBALL ASS’N, http://www.thefa.com/football-rules-governance/equality/race-
equality; Tackling Racism and Discrimination in Sport: Guide of Promising Practice, Initiatives and Activities, 
EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS., http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/guide-tackling-racism-
in-sport_en.pdf; see Overview, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS http://www.uefa.org/aboutuefa/organisation/ 
history/index.html. 
 312 Race Equality, supra note 311; Tackling Racism and Discrimination in Sport, supra note 311; see 
Overview, supra note 311. 
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the last twenty years, and Romania had a three day campaign against racism in 
2006 called “Racism Breaks the Game.”313 This exemplifies the common 
policy of the various football associations and UEFA. 
FFP is just another example of the use of the collective dominance of the 
national Football Associations, and UEFA. While this Comment is addressing 
UEFA’s Financial Fair Play, there have been similar initiatives concerning the 
financial stability of football clubs by the national football associations of 
France and Germany in place for the past several years, and England 
implemented their version in 2013,314 which demonstrates the linkage and how 
various national football associations and UEFA act as one economic entity on 
the European football market. 
If FFP is seen as having a vertical economic effect, it can be argued that the 
national football associations and UEFA do not have collective dominance due 
to the vertical commercial relationship between football associations and 
UEFA—UEFA providing European competitions for the clubs who are part of 
the national football associations that form UEFA, or the regulatory control 
that UEFA retains over the national football associations. This could be 
considered a vertical relationship, due to hierarchal nature of the regulatory 
body.315 However, even if the Court decides that there is a vertical commercial 
relationship, the Court of First Instance has found in Irish Sugar v Commission 
that a vertical commercial relationship does not affect the finding of a joint 
dominant position, as long as the undertakings are not integrated to the extent 
of being considered one undertaking.316 As established above, it is clear UEFA 
can be considered a separate economic entity from the national football 
associations because the football associations retain economic independence 
from UEFA.317 
 
 313 Race Equality, supra note 311; Tackling Racism and Discrimination in Sport, supra note 311; see 
Overview, supra note 311. 
 314 Supra Part II. The English Football Association has recently put into place a similar initiative, based 
on the FFP rules. See David Conn, New Premier League Rules Derived from Self-interest, Not Fair Play, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2013/feb/07/premier-league-self-
interest-fair-play; Premier League Agrees New Financial Regulations, BBC SPORT (Feb. 8, 2013, 9:17 AM), 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/21374699; see Owen Gibson, Richard Scudamore: Financial Fair Play 
Rules Unsustainable in Present Form, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2014, 1:27 PM), http://www.theguardian. 
com/football/2014/mar/14/financial-fair-play-rules-unsustainable-richard-scudamore-premier-league. 
 315 However, as discussed above this relationship may be viewed instead as horizontal between different 
clubs and football associations. See supra Part III. 
 316 Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar plc v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II-2975, 3004-05. 
 317 See HOLT, supra note 27, at 114. 
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It is also arguable that since football associations have voting power in 
UEFA, that the football associations, not a separate entity, control UEFA. 
However, there are influences outside of the football associations that have 
bearing on UEFA’s decisions. There are various committees that submit 
advice, proposals and recommendations to UEFA’s Executive Committee, 
which makes the final decisions.318 Some examples of these committees 
include the Football Committee (composed of the leagues), the Club 
Competitions Committee (composed largely of clubs), and the Players’ Status, 
Transfer and Agents and Match Agents Committee (composed of clubs and 
players’ unions).319 These Committees show that as with any other governing 
body, there are external influences that affect UEFA’s decisions, and due to 
these external influences, the national football associations do not have the 
only voice in UEFA’s actions. 
UEFA and the national football associations can be considered as having 
collective dominance because each is a separate economic entity, but act 
collectively as one in the European football market. 
B. Conduct Affecting a Substantial Part of the Market 
To find an Article 102 violation, it is necessary to consider whether the 
conduct of the collective dominance or the undertaking affects a substantial 
part of the internal market.320 As shown earlier, European football is the only 
European wide club football competition and there is a substantial amount of 
money involved through broadcasting contracts and prize money.321 Through 
the geographic reach and the amount of money involved, it is clear that there is 
a substantial part of the market involved.322 
C. Dominant Position is Abusively Exploitative 
An abuse of a dominant position is when the undertaking, or the collective 
dominance, influences the structure of the market such that because of the very 
presence of the undertaking or the collective dominance, the degree of 
 
 318 Committees and panels, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, http://www.uefa.org/about-uefa/ 
committees-panels/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
 319 Id. 
 320 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 166. 
 321 See supra Part I.C. 
 322 See EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 185 (citing Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113, 114/73, Suiker 
Unie and Others v. Comm’n 1975 E.C.R 1663). 
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competition weakens.323 This Comment will explore in turn 1) if the Court 
finds collective dominance, how the collective dominance weakens the market, 
2) if the Court finds there is a single undertaking, how the single undertaking 
influences the market and weakens competition. Under either argument, there 
is an Article 102 violation. 
1. The Collective Dominance Being Abusively Exploitative of the Market 
Weakens the  Market 
If we take the view that there is collective dominance, UEFA and the 
national football associations abused their position when establishing FFP by 
establishing unfair market competitions that exclude smaller leagues and clubs 
from playing at the European club level.324 When looking at the exclusion 
within a market, the best way to analyze the anti-competitiveness of FFP is an 
effect-based analysis of the market.325 In 2005, the EU commission published a 
consultation paper, titled “An Economic Approach to [Article 102 TFEU]” that 
discusses an effect-based approach to competition law.326 The paper discusses 
how the effects of the anticompetitive conduct and the competitive harm 
should be examined.327 To do this, there needs to be proof of actual economic 
harm based on facts.328 Therefore, the effects of FFP will be examined by 
analyzing how FFP is excluding smaller leagues from the European 
competition club market, due to the inability of clubs from smaller leagues to 
improve the coefficient needed to reach European football under FFP. 
UEFA and those top national football associations, by establishing FFP, are 
using their dominant position to weaken the competition in the market by only 
allowing certain clubs the ability to compete and afford multiple key players. 
As discussed earlier, the market will be entrenched, which will not allow 
smaller clubs to have the necessary financial means to buy better, more 
expensive players in order to make that leap to being a bigger club.329 FFP 
 
 323 Id. at 167. 
 324 Smaller leagues or clubs are a common term used to describe weaker leagues or clubs. Big clubs or big 
leagues will be used to refer to leagues or clubs that have been traditionally considered strong, such as the 
English Premier League, or Real Madrid. 
 325 See EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 173.  
 326 Id. This paper is not binding, but “has stimulated the debate over the realm of Article 102 TFEU,” 
implying the influence this paper has when analyzing Article 102. Id. 
 327 Jordi Gual et al., Report by the EAGCP: An Economic Approach to Article 82, ECON. ADVISORY 
GROUP ON COMPETITION POL’Y OF THE EUR. COMM’N, 2 (July 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/ 
economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf.  
 328 Id. 
 329 Supra Part I.C. 
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creates an artificial barrier preventing smaller clubs from reaching the financial 
capability of the larger clubs, which in turn creates a barrier between smaller 
leagues, and the ability of smaller leagues to grow into a big league.330 
Before FFP, smaller clubs and leagues could improve their position, which 
led to greater revenue and the ability to grow into a ‘big’ league. For example, 
Ligue 1, the top French league has grown in the past decade. Until 2009, Lyon 
dominated Ligue 1, but recently, Ligue 1 has become more competitive, in part 
because of the external investment in Paris Saint-Germain.331 The investment 
in PSG raised interest in Ligue 1 and incentivized other clubs to raise their 
game to try and stay competitive with PSG.332 That strengthens Ligue 1 in 
general, and the increased competition leads to increased interest 
internationally, which leads to new markets, increased jersey sales, and more 
revenue from television rights.333 
Ligue 1 would not have been able to raise interest in their league under the 
FFP rules, due to the lack of external investment. Under UEFA’s coefficient, 
only one or two Champions League spots are given to the weaker leagues, such 
as the Scottish or Dutch leagues.334 Now under the FFP rules, only a few clubs 
have the financial means, under the break-even rule, to strengthen their squad 
and improve to be a bigger club.335 All the other clubs in those weaker leagues 
lack the financial means to strengthen their squad and be in a position to 
receive the license required to play in the European football. Since clubs lack 
the financial means to strengthen their squad, the league as a whole cannot get 
more competitive and reach the level of the English Premier League or La 
Liga. 
The collective dominance of the larger national associations and leagues 
excludes the smaller clubs and the smaller leagues from the European football 
market by instituting FFP. FFP weakens competition by keeping the weaker 
 
 330 Supra Part I.C. 
 331 Jonathan Johnson, Why French Ligue 1 Deserves More of Our Attention, BLEACHER REP. (Jan. 18, 
2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1490231-why-french-ligue-1-deserves-more-of-our-attention/; see 
also ALL TO PLAY FOR, supra note 164, at 18. 
 332 Johnson, supra note 331; see also Christopher Almeras, Could Ligue 1’s Growing South American 
Influence Change the French Game?, BLEACHER REP. (Sept. 12, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/ 
1331836-could-ligue-1s-growing-south-american-influence-change-the-french-game. 
 333 Almeras, supra note 175.  
 334 Country Coefficients 2013/14, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, http://www.uefa.com/ 
memberassociations/uefarankings/country/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
 335 The prize and broadcasting money that comes from competing in European football. See supra Part 
I.C. 
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leagues weak. This is because the weaker leagues will continue to stay small, 
so there will be less competition for players and sponsorship rights, which 
additionally weakens competition. 
The biggest weakness with this argument is that the weaker leagues agreed 
to FFP through the hierarchal nature of the national football associations.336 
However, a counter-argument to this weakness is that the smaller leagues do 
not have as much say as the larger leagues concerning these types of 
agreements.337 One example of this is the influence of the European Club 
Association, who approved FFP.338 ECA’s membership consists of the 
strongest clubs from each country based on the UEFA coefficient, with 
representation increasing if a club won some sort of European trophy, played 
in the Group Stage of the Champions League, or qualified for the Champions 
League or the Europa League three times in the past five years.339 The stronger 
leagues, like the Premier League or La Liga, have many more representatives 
than the smaller leagues like Ukraine or Bulgaria’s league.340 It is plain that the 
larger leagues have much more say than smaller leagues do, even though every 
UEFA member has at least one member club part of the ECA.341 Additionally, 
FFP only needed approval from the Executive Committee, not UEFA’s 
Congress.342 
So while the smaller leagues cannot lodge a complaint against FFP 
directly,343 since they technically agreed to the FFP rules through the 
hierarchal nature of the regulatory bodies, the smaller leagues are not in reality 
part of the collective dominance, as they were so far from the decision making 
process. The collective dominance of the larger national associations and 
leagues excludes the smaller clubs from the European football market and 
proves FFP is anticompetitive. 
 
 336 See supra Part I.A. 
 337 See generally Scott, supra note 37. 
 338 See id. (noting that the European clubs have threatened to break away from FIFA and UEFA unless 
their concerns over international financing conditions are met). 
 339 ECA Membership, EUR. CLUB ASS’N, http://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/eca-membership/ (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
 340 See id.; Scott, supra note 37.  
 341 See ECA Membership, supra note 339; see Scott, supra note 37.  
 342 The Executive Committee is composed of only fifteen members elected by the UEFA Congress and 
has the overall control of UEFA. UEFA Executive Committee, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, http://www. 
uefa.org/about-uefa/executive-committee/index.html. UEFA Congress is composed of all member 
associations. UEFA Congress, UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, http://www.uefa.org/about-uefa/ 
organisation/congress/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
 343 However, an outside party like a player’s agent who lodges a complaint can use this as an argument. 
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2. The Single Undertaking, UEFA Uses its Dominant Position To Weaken 
Markets 
Another way FFP violates Article 102 is exclusion in adjacent markets, as 
discussed by the Commission in the 2005 consultation paper.344 If taking the 
view that UEFA is an undertaking itself, FFP influencing the structure of 
adjacent markets is the strongest argument that FFP is violating Article 102. 
When discussing FFP, this would be the European club market and the 
adjacent or sub-market would be the domestic club market, the national 
leagues. As stated in the consultation paper, the key to proving competitive 
harm in an adjacent market is to show linkage between the markets that place 
some rivals at a competitive disadvantage.345 Now, this Comment will analyze 
how FFP affects the domestic club markets.346 
FFP affects clubs in the domestic club leagues who are not required to 
follow FFP. Clubs who did not qualify for European football are not required 
to follow FFP rules, however if a club improves to a qualifying European 
football position, but is not following FFP, the club will not receive the license 
required to compete in European football.347 The club’s increased standing is 
worthless.348 This means clubs in the lower tiers of the domestic leagues, and 
those clubs lower in the table of the top tier of domestic club football will feel 
the effects of FFP, despite not being required to follow the regulations.349 
By dictating who can participate in UEFA competitions and who cannot, 
UEFA ensures that the clubs’ positions in the domestic club market will be 
entrenched, preventing opportunities to significantly improve standing.350 The 
 
 344 Report by the EAGCP, supra note 327, at 17. 
 345 Id. 
 346 Note that FFP is only required of clubs that play in the European competitions. However, some leagues 
have implemented their own version of FFP. See FFP Regulations, supra note 46, at 1. 
 347 See id. at 12. 
 348 Increased standing but not competing in European football will be considered worthless to many fans 
and players, due to the amount of prestige associated with European football. See supra Part I.C. 
 349 Note that many leagues are now implementing their own version of Financial Fair Play. See, e.g., 
Bryan A., A Brief Analysis of the Premier League’s New Financial Fair Play Regulations, SBNATION (Apr. 
11, 2013, 5:05 PM), http://cartilagefreecaptain.sbnation.com/2013/4/11/4212852/financial-fair-play-english-
premier-league-UEFA-Scudamore. 
 350 For example, in the English Premier League, when looking at the final standings from the last decade, 
it is consistent who are in the top four, with very few exceptions: Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea or 
Liverpool—later replaced by Manchester City. In part, these clubs stayed in the top four due to the money that 
they received in the European competitions, and could re-invest in the club. Without external investment, the 
smaller clubs not in European football will not be able to be able to compete on the domestic market with the 
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small clubs are disallowed any realistic chance to catch up to the big clubs 
within the club competitions at the domestic level.351 Small clubs will never be 
able to gain the same amount of broadcasting or sponsorship revenue as the big 
clubs; for example, Spain’s two largest clubs, Real Madrid and Barcelona, 
receive thirty-five percent of the revenue from La Liga’s television revenue.352 
The distribution of the television revenue is not evenly split or fair. There is no 
way for smaller clubs to achieve break-even at the same monetary amount, as 
the big clubs who participate in European football. Small clubs will always be 
at an artificial competitive disadvantage. FFP weakens the competitive balance 
in the domestic club markets.353 
This argument could prove an anti-competitive effect under Article 102, 
but it is much weaker than the anti-competitive argument under Article 101. 
The Article 102 arguments’ main weakness is that the smaller clubs and 
leagues did technically agree to FFP, through the hierarchal structure of the 
football regulatory structure.354 These arguments could be saved if the smaller 
clubs or leagues had a legitimate choice or a voice approving FFP, but this 
argument depends on how the Court would view this issue, as there is no case-
law available regarding a similar situation. Another difficulty with this 
argument is also based on an effect analysis of the clear anti-competitive 
effects of FFP, rather than established case law. Since this argument would be 
 
big clubs. Barclays Premier League Table, ESPNFC, http://espnfc.com/tables?league=eng.1&cc=5901 (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 351 Due to inability to obtain external investment, smaller clubs will have weaker squads than larger clubs, 
which will weaken the overall level of competition in the league. The small clubs are essentially prohibited to 
reach the league positions that the big clubs are currently occupying. For example, the English Premier League 
(EPL) is known as the big four, which tend to take the top four spots in the league standings each year. For 
years, the big four was Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea and Liverpool. Recently, the big four have 
become the big six, with the addition of Manchester City and Tottenham Hotspurs. Under FFP, it is unlikely 
the big six will change in the coming years. Especially since EPL has only five European spots, and the 
financial rewards that come with those spots make it difficult for lower table clubs to reach the upper echelon. 
Andrew McKenize, Has the Premier League’s Big Four Become a Big Two?, BBCSPORT (Aug. 13, 2010), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/eng_prem/8888167.stm; Richard Jolly, Changing Dynamics of the 
‘Big Six’ in Premier League Title Race, THE NAT’L (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.thenational.ae/sport/football/ 
changing-dynamics-of-the-big-six-in-premier-league-title-race#full; Alex McLeish Says Aston Villa Struggle to 
Compete with Top Clubs, BBCSPORT (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/14844717; 
Barclays Premier League Table, ESPNFC, http://espnfc.com/tables?league=eng.1&cc=5901 (last visited Nov. 
11, 2014). 
 352 See supra Part I.C.; Spanish Football League Seeking to Balance Distribution of TV Revenue in Next 
Contract, SPORTSBUSINESS GLOBAL (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Global/Issues/2014/ 
02/25/Media/La-Liga.aspx. 
 353 The competition within the league, as well as competition over players and sponsorships, is weakened. 
 354 See supra Part I.B.i; supra Part IV.B.i. This aspect of the article explains why an outside person, the 
player agent Straini, had to file the complaint rather than a club or a league. 
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much harder to hold up in court, it should only be used in the unlikely event 
that the Article 101 (1) argument fails. 
D. Defenses 
There are two potential defenses under Article 102. First, if it can be shown 
that the FPP has a legitimate objective, and the anti-competitive actions taken 
to achieve that objective generate efficiencies that outweigh the anti-
competitive effects, then the Article 102 argument fails.355 Secondly, since 
Article 102 arguments require an appreciable effect on trade between member 
states, a lack of such effects will defeat this argument.356 
1. Objective Justification 
While FFP does have a legitimate objective, its efficiencies do not 
outweigh its anti-competitive effects.357 Both the Court of Justice and the 
European Commission have held that if the exclusionary effect goes beyond 
what is necessary, then the system is regarded as an abuse.358 Again, as 
discussed earlier, FFP goes beyond what is necessary to achieve efficiency for 
the market.359 There are better ways to achieve financial stability for clubs than 
FFP, as this Comment will discuss in showing that the objective justification 
defense will not work.360 
2. Appreciable Effect on Trade Between Member States 
An appreciable effect on trade between member states means that the 
conduct has the potential to affect trade between the member states of the 
EU.361 FFP has the clear potential to affect trade between member states; 
players are commonly traded among different leagues, and the broadcasting 
revenues from many different countries and European club competition come 
from all over Europe.362 Therefore, this defense would not apply either. 
 
 355 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 172.  
 356 Id. at 173.  
 357 See supra Part III.D.i. 
 358 Case C-95/04 P, British Airways v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, 2355; Case COMP/C-3/37.990, 
Intel [2009], O.J. C227/07, para. 1624. 
 359 See supra Part III.D.ii. 
 360 See infra Part V. 
 361 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 264 (citing Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar plc v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II-
2969). 
 362 Supra Part I.C. 
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V. ALTERNATIVES TO FFP 
While FFP is clearly anti-competitive and illegal under EU competition 
law, the FFP objectives to introduce more discipline and rationality in club 
football finances, and to protect the long-term viability of European club 
football are legitimate and justified goals.363 FFP’s problem is that it is too 
heavily restrictive and is not necessary or proportionate to achieve these 
objectives. 
Under Wouters and Meca-Medina, the Court of Justice found that 
restricting competition might not be illegal under EU competition law if the 
objectives of the restriction are justified.364 In Meca-Medina, another case 
concerning sports, it was held that the restrictions may not “go beyond what is 
necessary in order to ensure that sporting events take place and function 
properly.”365 The restrictions must be objectively necessary and 
proportionate,366 and FFP is not. FFP is very unlikely to be upheld in court, 
therefore UEFA should explore other options to achieve its goals of protecting 
the long-term viability of European club football. 
Now, this Comment will explore what kind of regulations could replace 
FFP by being proportionate to the restrictions to fulfill FFP’s justified 
objections of introducing more discipline and rationality in club football 
finances and fixing the financial issues of many clubs. Both Germany and 
France had their own version of financial fair play regulations in place before 
UEFA passed FFP. This Comment will consider each of these regulations in 
turn, along with how parts of those regulations may take the place of UEFA’s 
FFP, and ensure legality under EU competition law. This Comment will then 
explain other potential ways to protect the long-term viability of European club 
football. 
1. Germany’s Financial Regulations 
The national football association of Germany maintains a balanced books 
provision in order to receive the license required for a club to compete each 
 
 363 Financial Fair Play, supra note 18. 
 364 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 97, 104 (citing Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de 
Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. I-1653, 1670); Weatherill, supra note 154. 
 365 EZRACHI, supra note 115, at 97 (citing Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Comm’n, 2006 
E.C.R. I-7006, 7026). 
 366 Id. 
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year.367 The clubs must submit financial data each year.368 Additionally, debt 
levels are closely monitored to reduce the risk of insolvency, and expensive 
player transfers are vetoed if the transfers look unaffordable.369 
FFP is modeled after the German model, but there is a key difference: FFP 
has a fair value provision for sponsorships that the German model does not 
have.370 The absence of a fair value provision allows owners to inject money 
into the club by overpaying for sponsorship deals through another company the 
club owner owns. For example, Wolfsburg, a smaller club, has a shirt 
sponsorship deal with Volkswagen, which is also owned by the club’s owner, 
worth €20 million a year, similar to shirt sponsorship deals for clubs like 
Liverpool FC or Bayern Munich.371 The German model does not penalize 
owners for these types of deals, unlike FFP. FFP has in place a fair value 
provision to avoid injections of this sort by owners.372 
The fair value provision requires that transactions with related parties be 
carried out at fair value, and the club may be forced to remove some of that 
sponsorship money for the purposes of the break-even provision.373 For 
example, Paris Saint-Germain is owned by Qatar Sports Investments.374 In 
2012, Paris Saint-Germain secured a sponsorship agreement that guarantees 
 
 367 Gard Lid Aabakken, Financial Fair Play Explained—and the Implications for Bundesliga Clubs, 
BUNDESLIGAFANATIC.COM (Oct. 9, 2012), http://bundesligafanatic.com/financial-fair-play-the-implications-
for-the-teams-in-the-bundesliga/; The Core Functions of the DFL, BUNDESLIGA, http://www.bundesliga.com/ 
en/about/our-task/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
 368 HOUSE OF COMMONS, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE, REPORT, 
2010-12, HC 792-1, 56 (U.K.).  
 369 Ben Chu, Real Madrid v Borussia Dortmund: Europe’s Balance of Power Tipping Towards a German 
Bundesliga That’s Expert in Balancing Books, THE INDEP. (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
sport/football/European/real-madrid-v-borussia-dortmund-europes-balance-of-power-tipping-towards-a-
german-bundesliga-thats-expert-in-balancing-books-8595644.html. 
 370 FFP Regulations, supra note 46, at 83. 
 371 Aabakken, supra note 367; German Bundesliga Clubs Earn $173M From Shirt Sponsorship Deals, 
SPORTSBUSINESS GLOBAL (July 26, 2012), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Global/Issues/2012/07/26/ 
Marketing-and-Sponsorship/Shirt-Sponsor.aspx. 
 372 FFP Regulations, supra note 46, at 83. 
 373 UEFA’s FFP Regulations—Play To Win, SWISSRAMBLE (Sept. 5, 2012), http://swissramble.blogspot. 
com/2012/09/uefas-ffp-regulations-play-to-win.html; Kok Chee Kheong, The UEFA Financial Fair Play 
Regulations, SKRINE, http://www.skrine.com/the-uefa-financial-fair-play-regulations (last visited Nov. 11, 
2014); Gabriele Marcotti, Euopean Soccer Goes Federal, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB10001424052748703358504575544030227545858. 
 374 John Sinnott, Qatari Takeover Heralds New Dawn for Paris Saint-Germain, BBCSPORT (Aug. 3, 
2011, 10:10 PM), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/14393012. 
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the club €150-200 million a year.375 UEFA found that this agreement is 
improper under FFP, since the agreement is worth more than its market value, 
the excess amount from the sponsorship agreement.376 UEFA valued the deal 
at only €100 million and will count that sum towards the club’s accounts.377 
Paris Saint-Germain failed Financial Fair Play rules in 2014, due to this 
sponsorship deal.378 
To make FFP more proportionate to its objective, it may be better and legal 
for UEFA to have a mandatory review of the financial data of each club every 
year similar to the German model, before giving clubs the license required to 
compete in the European club competitions. Instead of FFP explicitly rejecting 
owners’ contributions of their own money to their clubs, FFP should be 
ensuring that the books even out, without regard to the origin of the money. If 
an owner intends to contribute to their club, it should be required that they 
make a solid commitment that will display in the club’s financial records, 
which UEFA will inspect when granting licenses. The fair value provision 
should be eliminated. Owners should be able to contribute financially through 
excess sponsorships through their other companies, because it will appear on 
the books and demonstrate the amount of external investment that can be 
attributed to the owners. 
2. France’s Financial Regulations 
This Comment will now explore the financial regulations in the French 
league. The financial governance of Ligue 1, France’s top tier league, is 
directed by the Direction Nationale du Controle de Gestion (DNCG) which 
oversees every club’s finances and has the power to sanction clubs if they do 
not protect the financial sustainability of that club.379 This regulatory body 
controls the legal and financial situation of the clubs.380 The most common 
 
 375 Marco Bellinazzo, Commercial Revenues: Premier League and Bundesliga Eclipse Serie A Clubs, 
SERIE ADDICTED (May 1, 2014), http://www.serieaddicted.com/article/commercial-revenues_premier-league-
and-bundesliga-eclipse-serie-a-clubs.php. 
 376 Richard Conway, Paris Saint-Germain’s £167m Deal Fails UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules, 
BBCSPORT (Aug. 3, 2011, 5:34 PM), http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/27243933. 
 377 Mark Robben, Reports: UEFA to Devalue PSG deal, ESPNFC (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.espnfc. 
com/uefa-champions-league/story/1802680/reports-uefa-halves-value-of-paris-saint-germain-sponsorship-
deal-with-qatar-tourism-authority. 
 378 Id. 
 379 Andrew Wenger, UEFA Financial Fair Play, SOCCER POL./THE POL. OF FOOTBALL (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://sites.duke.edu/wcwp/2012/12/27/uefa-financial-fair-play/. 
 380 Direction Nationale du Controle de Geston, Annexea la Convention FFF/LFP (2009-2010), Annex 1, 
available at http://www.lfp.fr/dncg/Reglements_DNCG_Annexe_FFF_LFP.pdf. 
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penalty is requiring clubs to establish a budget for hiring or imposing limits on 
the payroll of the clubs.381 The purpose of this is to educate the club on how to 
remain financially stable.382 DNCG is a regulatory body whose intention is not 
to audit the financials of each club, but to oversee how much each club owes to 
debtors, the club’s provisional accounts for the next season, and an operating 
forecast for the next three seasons.383 Again, there is no fair value provision.384 
The French version of FFP is much more proportionate than UEFA’s FFP 
regulations. UEFA’s FFP regulations, which include the fair value provisions, 
are not the least restrictive means of reaching FFP-stated objectives of 
introducing more discipline and rationality in club football finances and 
providing for long-term financial viability of football. DNCG has the right idea 
to look at how much a club owes each year. 
3. Less Restrictive Ways to Regulate Clubs Finances 
Looking at the yearly debt of each club is less restrictive and achieves the 
FPP’s objective of regulating club finances. Both DNCG and the German 
Football Association consider clubs’ yearly and overall debt levels. It might be 
preferable for UEFA to examine the amount by which each club’s debt rises 
each year, or the amount of debt a club has compared to its annual revenue. If 
the debt rises above a certain percentage or a certain amount, then UEFA 
should bring sanctions. The sanctions should be similar to the sanctions DNCG 
has in place, requiring clubs to establish a budget for hiring or imposing limits 
on the payroll of the clubs. If a club is banned from European club 
competitions, their financial situation is likely to worsen, not improve, due to 
the loss of ticket revenue, prize money, and broadcasting revenue. UEFA could 
also require the club to make a realistic plan how to reduce debt, and the 
UEFA should only ban the club from European competitions if the club does 
not do so in a given amount of time. 
As an alternative to FFP, UEFA should explore other options to introduce 
more discipline and rationality in club football finances, rather than granting a 
 
 381 Karl Lusbec, The UEFA Financial Fair Play; An Inspiration from the French DNCG?, KARL’S 
FOOTBALL LOUNGE: THE FOOTBALL MARKETING BLOG (Feb. 2, 2011), http://karllusbec.wordpress.com/2011/ 
02/02/the-uefa-financial-fair-play-a-inspiration-from-the-french-dncg/. 
 382 Id. 
 383 Direction Nationale du Controle de Geston, Annexea la Convention FFF/LFP, supra note 380. 
 384 See Alexandre Schmid, Le Fair-Play Financier prêt à Bouleverser l’Europe?, GOAL.COM (July 19, 
2013), http://www.goal.com/fr/news/196/europe/2013/07/19/4129237/le-fair-play-financier-prêt-à-
bouleverser-leurope. 
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license based on financial accounts. UEFA could consider at a standardized 
salary cap at the same rate for each club, which would equalize the playing 
field for the teams. Eliminating the break-even provision eliminates the anti-
competition issue, since the main issue with this provision is that different 
clubs are limited to spending different amounts of money. However, clubs may 
not approve this proposal. Traditionally European football has never had a hard 
restraint on how much a team could spend, and a hard salary cap restricting all 
the clubs to spending the same amount of money might be too much of a 
radical change.385 Instead, UEFA could place a cap on transfer fees386 or a 
ceiling on the amount of income can be spent on wages.387 A transfer cap or a 
wage ceiling, along with regulatory body oversight on club debt levels may be 
sufficient to introduce more discipline and rationality without the overly 
restrictive constraints of FFP. 
UEFA could also combat excess spending by implementing a luxury tax.388 
If a club exceeds a given threshold, the club would be required to pay the 
league a Euro-to-Euro amount, which would be re-distributed to other teams to 
help create a competitive balance.389 Or alternatively, similar to the NBA 
luxury tax, 390 UEFA could implement a sliding scale with a higher charge than 
the Euro-to-Euro amount after every €5 or 10 million. However, the luxury cap 
presents the issue of determining to whom UEFA would give the money, 
whether that be only clubs in European football or to all the top league clubs in 
UEFA. Potentially, UEFA could require each league to have a luxury tax, so 
the football associations will receive any luxury tax from clubs in that 
domestic league and can distribute the tax equally among all clubs in the top 
tier in the domestic leagues. This would avoid the issue of anti-competitive 
action associated with only distributing the money to clubs in European 
football. 
Another alternative to FFP could be a shared revenue scheme, such that 
smaller clubs would not risk as much to reach the next level of football 
 
 385 See Steve Tounge, Clubs in Wage-Restraint Talks, THE INDEP. (Oct. 14, 2012), http://www. 
independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/clubs-in-new-wagerestraint-talks-8210351.html. 
 386 Ouriel Daskal, Financial Fair Play Fail, SOCCERISSUE.COM (May 24, 2012), http://www.soccerissue. 
com/2012/05/24/financial-fair-fail/. 
 387 Tounge, supra note 385. 
 388 Ouriel Daskal, UEFA Should Seriously Consider an Alternative to FFP, SOCCERISSUE.COM (Mar. 29, 
2013), http://www.soccerissue.com/2013/03/29/uefa-should-seriously-consider-an-alternative-to-ffp/. 
 389 Id. 
 390 Moke Hamilton, How NBA’s Luxury Tax Penalties Will Impact Elite Teams, BLEACHER REP. (Dec. 26, 
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competitions. Clubs would likely balk at the notion of an expectation to share 
merchandising or sponsorship revenues with other clubs, as sharing revenue in 
football is a revolutionary idea in European football. Instead, the broadcasting 
revenues from European football could be shared among all clubs in the 
national association, not only those competing in European football. 
Broadcasting has a significant impact on club revenues, especially in smaller 
leagues like Portugal.391 If the national football association splits the 
broadcasting revenue equally between all the teams, there will be greater 
competitive balance and less incentive to go into debt to reach European 
football. 
Ticket revenue sharing is another way to share revenue. This is not a 
revolutionary concept, as it occurs in the FA Cup.392 Clubs will be unlikely to 
agree to share all ticket revenue, but an amount around 15% of the ticket 
revenues for European football to be divided among all the clubs in that 
national football association may be acceptable. Sharing some of the ticket 
revenue will decrease the incentive to go into debt to reach European football 
and will promote the long-term viability of European club football.393 From 
these examples it is clear that there are many other less restricting ways than 
the break-even provision, which is not the most proportionate or less restrictive 
way to achieve FFP’s objectives. 
Additionally, FFP may be working against its own objectives with the 
break-even provision. FFP may cause clubs whose owners are wealthy enough 
to contribute their own money to be on shakier financial ground, since owners 
are no longer permitted to inject their money into their clubs to remedy any 
financial shortcomings. Clubs are searching for ways around this obstacle, but 
their success in avoiding sanctions is yet to be determined.394 For example, as 
discussed earlier, Paris Saint-Germain is clearly able to get the money it needs 
to stay on financially stable ground, but would be in violation of UEFA’s FFP 
 
 391 Even in smaller leagues the amount of money received from European football will make a large 
difference under the break-even provision. For example, when looking at the top Italian League, Seria A, AC 
Milan made €140.9 million in broadcasting in the 2012-2013 season, while AS Roma made only €66 million. 
This huge difference is due to the fact that AC Milan competed in the Champions League, while AS Roma did 
not compete in European football. This is a significant advantage, especially when considering AS Roma 
received 53% of its total revenue from broadcasting. A return to European competitions will be essential for 
significant growth in AS Roma in the future. See ALL TO PLAY FOR, supra note 164, at 9, 34.  
 392 THE FOOTBALL ASS’N, THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE FA CUP 7 (Jan. 2012). 
 393 See supra Part I.C. 
 394 See Marcotti, supra note 373. 
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rules. Instead, Paris Saint-Germain has a sham sponsorship deal worth €150–
200 million a year that gives no shirt sponsorship or stadium naming rights.395 
Under Wouters and Meca-Medina, anti-competitive restrictions are 
permitted if they are the least restrictive and most proportionate means by 
which to achieve a justified objective. These alternatives to FFP are less 
restrictive and more proportionate to achieve FFP’s objective of repairing the 
broken football economic market. UEFA should explore these options, and 
replace the overly restrictive FFP with one of the alternatives. 
CONCLUSION 
Financial Fair Play is illegal under European Union competition law. When 
the Court decides the Striani challenge, the outcome should be that FFP is 
illegal under EU competition law. FFP can be challenged under either Article 
101(1), or Article 102. However, the legal challenge is much more likely to 
succeed under Article 101(1). Only if the legal challenge using Article 101(1) 
should fail should there be a legal challenge under Article 102. 
The legal challenge is more likely to succeed under Article 101(1). Under 
Article 101(1), FFP is affecting competition by creating divisions between 
national markets.396 Additionally, under Article 101, FFP has clear actual 
effect of restricting or distorting the competition.397 FFP will lower players’ 
wages, reduce the number of transfers and their monetary worth, and forbid 
smaller clubs or leagues from competing with larger ones.398 FFP will have an 
anti-competitive effect on the European club football market. Any defense 
UEFA may raise will fail, because FFP does not fit any of the criteria required 
and FFP’s anti-competitive effect is not proportionate to its objective. 
An article 102 argument should be raised only if the Article 101 argument 
fails, which is very unlikely. Under Article 102, FFP excludes smaller clubs 
and leagues within the European football market, and excludes smaller clubs 
within the domestic clubs markets from the possibility of improving.399 
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There are plenty less restrictive alternatives to the FPP regulations that will 
introduce financial responsibility and protect the long-term viability of the 
business of football. UEFA should look to alternative regulations to achieve 
these objectives. Instituting a luxury cap, keeping track of clubs’ debt level, or 
revenue sharing would be preferable alternatives to achieve UEFA’s goals.400 
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